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CHAPTER ONE: Introduction 
 
When examining Iraq’s current condition, one punctured by political chaos, a 
severely destabilized economy, and increased sectarian violence, it is difficult to 
understand which factors have most prominently contributed to Iraq’s 
devolvement.  Many of the academics who study the modern political history of Iraq 
argue that the country is structured in such a way that fosters political instability.  In his 
extensive study on Iraq’s political history, Gareth Stansfield identifies four broad 
themes that have negatively shaped the country on a national, regional and 
international level: the “artificiality debate” argues that Iraq, initially a monarchy 
legitimized by decree of the League of Nations in 1921, was inherently predisposed to 
political unrest due to colonial border drawing around vastly different communal 
groups; the “identity debate” suggests the concept of Iraqi nationalism has been 
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consistently trumped by religious and regional identifications; the “dictator debate” 
reflects the idea that much of Iraq’s modern history has witnessed authoritarian rule 
and a highly militarized state; and, lastly, the “democratization debate” considers the 
ways in which Iraq has grappled with the previous three debates to form a democratic 
government and come to terms with its authoritarian past (3-4).  While I will not rely 
exclusively on the four aforementioned themes, these debates are certainly useful when 
examining Iraq’s present unrest and the humanitarian crises enveloping the country, 
particularly because many of the debates framing these issues call upon Iraq’s unique 
colonial, sectarian, and authoritarian histories.  These issues figured perhaps most 
prominently before, during, and after the United States military invasion of 2003 and 
the subsequent occupation that officially lasted until December of 2011.   
Under the pretense of President Saddam Hussein’s possession of “weapons of 
mass destruction” that violated the United Nations Resolution 687, President George W. 
Bush initiated an extensive military occupation of Iraq that swiftly ousted Hussein and 
his Ba’th regime.  Two months before the invasion, the Office of Humanitarian and 
Reconstruction Assistance (ORHA), led by the retired US Army Lieutenant Jay Garner, 
was created to serve as an interim administration to oversee the establishment of an 
Iraqi democratic government.  ORHA was quickly replaced by the American-led 
interim government, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), which served as a 
faction of the US Department of Defense and provided the majority of funding to erect a 
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democratic government in Iraq.  In accordance with the mass arrival of international 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), much of the reconstruction period was 
focused around building a newly conceived Iraqi civil society, one that would foster 
democratic values and address the pressing humanitarian needs of Iraqi civilians.  The 
American military invasion successfully eliminated a crippling authoritarian regime, 
yet the subsequent military occupation also catalyzed drastic political violence, quickly 
devolving the country into a state of chaos and beckoning the emergence of a failed 
Iraqi state.  The introduction of a foreign military occupation in Iraq, while successful in 
eradicating a highly repressive regime, catalyzed a violent insurgent reaction on the 
ground, which was largely sectarian in nature.  The hostility geared towards the 
American presence, coupled with devastatingly poor planning methods for the post-
invasion period by the US Department of Defense, contributed to the emergence of an 
environment ill-equipped to address the humanitarian crises that arose following the 
collapse of Hussein’s government.  Interestingly, however, the occupation period 
witnessed the creation of an unprecedented number of humanitarian-oriented, nation-
based NGOs, which quickly became one of the most significant aspects of a newly 
configured Iraqi civil society.  Many of these organizations emerged because of the 
invasion, largely necessitated by the grave humanitarian crisis threatening the entirety 
of the country, but simultaneously suffered deeply throughout the invasion given Iraq’s 
ubiquitous and violent security situation.   
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This study thus examines the evolution of Iraqi humanitarian-oriented NGOs 
within the context of American military occupation from 2003-2011.  Through 
interviews with former American military and CPA personnel, international 
humanitarian workers, academics, and, crucially, Iraqi humanitarian workers, as well as 
extensive review of academic and NGO literature, the study will explore the factors, 
both positive and negative, that contributed to Iraq’s humanitarian sector during 
American military occupation and the ways in which these organizations operated 
within broader Iraqi civil society.  Relying on Larry Diamond’s definition of civil society 
as “an intermediary entity standing between the private sphere and the state”, I argue 
that three main variables stemming from the onset of military invasion have 
significantly contributed to both the formation and livelihood of Iraqi NGOs: the 
influence of international NGOs, the devolved security situation characterized most 
prominently by insurgent and counterinsurgent groups, and the structural forces 
imposed on Iraqi NGOs by both Iraqi and international actors. Both in spite of and 
because of these three variables, I ultimately claim that while these Iraqi-based, 
humanitarian-oriented NGOs are crucial forces within broader Iraqi civil society, the 
persistent context of military occupation ultimately compromised their ability to 
function optimally.   
Relevant Academic Literature 
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Academic literature that relates to this study, namely Thomas Weiss’ and Chris 
Seiple’s work, explores the relationship between humanitarian and military forces, and 
the ways in which these distinctions have been recently blurred in war 
contexts.  Anthropologist Nadya al-Ali’s work on Iraqi women has also been crucial for 
understanding the historical presence of female involvement in humanitarian work in 
Iraq, particularly her research on women’s organizations from the early twentieth 
century until present day.  Political scientists Larry Diamond and Sultan Barakat’s work 
on post-Saddam Iraq has also been heavily used for this study.  Very little academic 
literature, however, focuses on the Iraqi NGO sector.  One important exception is Cecile 
Genot’s extensive study on international NGOs’ role during the American military 
occupation, specifically the relationship with their Iraqi counterparts.   
Historical Context 
The concept of civil society in public discourse regarding the modern state of 
Iraq shifted rather dramatically with the American military removal of President 
Saddam Hussein and the broader Ba’ath political regime in April of 2003.  Until that 
point, the international community had associated Hussein and the Ba’ath political 
party as highly totalitarian, systematically suppressive of political dissent, and capable 
of eliminating those who did not align with the regime’s political and societal 
agenda.  It would be problematic to underestimate the magnitude of Hussein’s power 
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as both a political and national figure, particularly in relation to the ways in which he 
effectively silenced political opposition and crafted a state apparatus that would not 
allow for a thriving civil society, at least a type of civil society that has been delineated 
above.  In his article “Civil Society in the Arab Region”, Ziad Abdel Samad argues that 
much of the Arab world has not witnessed a flourishing civil society, largely 
characterized by a variety of civil society organizations, due to an ineffective legal 
framework, lack of democracy, and a severely centralized regime (5).  These factors 
certainly apply to Iraq under the Ba’ath regime and specifically to Hussein’s rule for 
largely two main reasons.  The first is that the state of Iraq under Saddam Hussein’s 
control implemented a variety of social welfare practices, so that for much of the 
seventies and eighties, Iraqi citizens enjoyed state-subsidized education, health care, 
child care, and a variety of other social services.  Within this governmental framework, 
humanitarian and service-oriented NGOs, while not rendered entirely unnecessary, 
were certainly perceived as redundant within certain contexts, as the Ba’ath regime 
strategically aimed to foster a citizen dependence upon the Iraqi state through a vast 
network of subsidized social services, while also attempting to prevent any political 
dissent that could potentially arise within non-governmental associations. The second 
reason surrounding the essential absence of a strong Iraqi civil society is that Hussein’s 
government so rigidly manipulated and controlled all factions of the Iraqi public sphere 
that opportunities for non-governmental associations, particularly those that would 
12 
 
provide lacking social services or advocate for specific humanitarian causes, were 
strikingly absent.  Further, no legal framework existed at the time to demarcate a 
political space for these non-governmental organizations to exist.  However, 
associations did operate similarly to the present day conception of non-governmental 
organizations, although these were predominantly government-controlled.  One of the 
more prominent organizations was the Red Crescent Society (RCS), similar in structure 
to the Western-operated Red Cross, which stemmed from the Iraqi Ministry of 
Health.  Founded in 1932 and headquartered in Iraq’s capital, Baghdad, the RCS serves 
as a charity organization that assists those in need with health, shelter, and disaster 
management services, among others.  The other notable state-controlled association 
operating under the Hussein government was the Women’s Union, which consisted of 
predominantly upper-middle class Iraqi women, most of whom were wives of 
prominent Ba’ath political party leaders, who conducted charity activities such as 
literacy training and lifestyle education (al-Ali 85).  In addition to the Women’s Union, 
several other organizations existed that operated mainly on a charity basis, focusing on 
child care, welfare for the poor, and assistance for disaster relief, and possessed strong 
ties to the ruling political elite, such as the Child Protection Society and the Houses of 
the People Society (al-Ali 85-6).   
While the above description constructs a rather bleak framework for Iraqi non-
governmental organizations prior to American military intervention in 2003, two 
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examples indicate that Iraqi civil society was not as lacking as some might suggest.  The 
more amenable political dynamics in northern Iraqi Kurdistan stand as one 
example.  Officially designated as an autonomous region of Iraq in 1991 and under 
international protection, the Kurdistan Regional Government proved significantly more 
accommodating to non-governmental organizations, particularly those that aimed to 
augment human rights.  While there are no official records of formal non-governmental 
organizations that existed before American occupation in 2003, there were a total of 34 
known NGOs in the northern Kurdish region compared to the eleven that existed in the 
rest of Iraq (al-Ali 206).  Multiple organizations formed during the nineties, some of 
which still operate today and contain a similar structure to prominent international 
NGOs.  The Iraqi al-Amal Association, perhaps one of the most pronounced of the 
Kurdistan organizations in terms of size and effectiveness, was established in 1992 
amidst grave humanitarian crises following the second Gulf War.  Equipped with a 
variety of services and oriented towards a multitude of factions within Iraqi society, al-
Amal’s primary concern is with cultivating a “culture of human rights, gender equality, 
tolerance, and social peace”, specifically within the most marginalized communities 
(Iraqi al-Amal).  Rather uncharacteristically of many Iraqi NGOs operating before the 
invasion, al-Amal directs itself with a strong legal purpose, pushing for legal reform 
and government accountability towards the populations they serve.  Notably, following 
the 2003 American invasion that greatly destroyed Iraq’s infrastructure and enveloped 
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the country in a grave humanitarian crisis, al-Amal spread its operations into the 
broader Iraq region, specifically around Baghdad where the most intense violence 
occurred.  Its website states: “the law of al-Amal…confirmed its identity to work for 
Iraqis without discrimination….Its founders and members of Board has reflected the 
variety of ethnic, religious and gender balance [of the Iraqi people]” (Iraqi Al-Amal). As 
will be argued later, the northern Kurdistan region, with a strong history of civic 
involvement, stands as a starkly positive example compared to the rest of Iraq. 
Another phenomenon that challenges the dominant view of a severely crippled Iraqi 
civil society before the 2003 US military occupation is the variety of women’s 
organizations, and the vibrant social movements they facilitated, that existed even 
before the emergence of the Ba’ath party into power.  Nadya al-Ali extensively explores 
this subject in her book Iraqi Women: Untold Stories from 1948 to the Present, both within 
Iraq and the variety of organizations formed by diasporic Iraqi women throughout the 
world.  She claims, “women were almost completely excluded from formal political 
institutions and processes, but from the 1920s onwards established a growing number 
of philanthropic, social and political organizations that were part of an emerging Iraqi 
‘civil order’”. (al-Ali 12) Al-Ali goes on to claim that much of the mobilization that 
fueled the emergence and success of so many women’s organizations must be 
contextualized by the broader Iraqi struggle against colonial and imperial forces 
(85).  For example, the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) reached its heyday following the 
15 
 
1958 coup and recruited thousands of Iraqi women to advocate for its political 
cause.  Various women and youth organizations were associated with the ICP, and it 
was within this political context that many Iraqi women were the most mobilized and 
organized for specific causes.  The Iraqi Ba’ath party also attracted many women 
supporters in the latter half of the twentieth century, which was situated amidst a 
broader pan-Arab nationalist movement spearheaded by Egypt’s charismatic leader, 
Gamal Abdel Nasser.  While ICP and Ba’ath party supporters were placed in rather 
oppositional stances, these secular movements involved numerous political 
organizations, particularly amongst women who had previously refrained from 
political participation. 
Contrary to the charitable organizations described above that were monopolized by 
mainly upper-class women with strong ties to the ruling political elite, several political 
movements, anchored and structured by a variety of women’s non-governmental 
organizations, emerged in the latter half of the twentieth century that encompassed a 
more diverse segment of Iraqi women. The Iraqi Women’s League stands as a notable 
example, which carries a long history of serving as the locus for the cultivation of 
political participation and activism amongst Iraqi women.  Originally formed by Dr. 
Naziha al-Dulaimi, a prominent Iraqi physician who is also distinguished as the first 
female minister in Iraq and the first female cabinet member in the broader Arab world, 
the organization initially operated as an underground movement following government 
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rejection for official recognition.  Changing its name from ‘Women’s Liberation Society’ 
to ‘League for Defending Iraqi Women’s Rights’, the organization emerged officially on 
March 10, 1952 to struggle for national liberation from lingering British colonialist 
influences, defend Iraqi women’s rights, and to promote the protection of Iraqi 
children.  Dr. al-Dulaimi served as an effective leader for the organization, which 
changed its name again to the Iraq Women’s League, and helped augment the League’s 
membership to an astonishing 42,000 members by the mid-1950s.  Following the 1958 
revolution (also known as the 14 July Revolution), an enormous political mobilization 
that established Iraq as a secular republic and ousted the tightly British-controlled 
monarchy, the League emerged as a solidly established mass organization with 
considerable influence on broader Iraqi society.  In contrast to many of the Kurdish 
NGOs that have a history of being strongly connected to either of the two main 
Kurdistan political parties, the Iraqi Women’s League consistently operated 
independently of Iraqi political parties and weathered decades of unstable political and 
governmental change.  Also notable of the Iraqi Women’s League was its ability to 
establish connections across political and regional divides.  An Iraqi woman involved 
with the movement explains: 
Rabitat [Iraqi Women’s League] became one of the strongest women’s 
organizations.  The Ba’athists and the Arab nationalists had a joint women’s 
organization called Nisa’ alJumhurriya (Women of the Republic).  They had a 
voice, but not as strong as Rabitat….In the north, there was a Kurdish women’s 
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organization.  We had lots of contact with them and we organized events 
together (al-Ali 87) 
  Clearly, the League’s status as the most preeminent and established women’s 
organization, and, arguably, one of the most effective organizations in Iraq before 2003 
that was not directly associated with the Iraqi government, helped fuel mobilization 
efforts that transcended highly divisive regional and sectarian lines.  The Iraqi Women’s 
League continued its activism throughout the American military invasion in 2003, and 
was amongst the most vocal critics of the war and its severe consequences on Iraqi 
society.  To indicate a benevolent incubation from harmful political forces for Iraqi 
women involved with the League would be misleading, however.  Several women 
involved with the League throughout the twentieth century were executed, tortured, 
and kidnapped by the Iraqi government, while countless others were raped and 
imprisoned for any assumed connection to the organization.  
In addition to the several Kurdish and women’s organizations that existed prior 
to the overthrow of the Hussein and Ba’ath regime, several art-related associations 
organized, particularly in the 1950s before the Ba’ath regime increased its repressive 
activities against non-government factions.  Baghdad Association of the Friends of Art, 
established in 1952, and the Baghdad Association for Modern Art, established in 1953, 
are notable examples (al-Ali 68) 
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While examples of organizations not directly associated with the Iraqi 
government have been briefly outlined above, it must again be reiterated a culture of 
NGOs did not exist in Iraq while Saddam Hussein was in power as it did following US 
military invasion in 2003.  While many of the organizations were certainly based on 
formerly existent networks-particularly tribal connections, which will be discussed 
more thoroughly in following chapters-, a culture of non-governmental associations did 
not exist prior to 2003, nor did the concept of Iraqi-based NGOs have legitimacy.  Thus, 
the overthrow of the Ba’ath regime, and the subsequent establishment of an interim, 
American-operated government, the CPA, created an arena for an unprecedented 
amount of non-governmental organizations to emerge.   
The International NGO Variable 
As mentioned above, the Ba’ath, and more specifically the Hussein, regime 
repressed all facets of political dissent or opposition, which created a complicated, if not 
downright hostile, environment for international organizations to involve 
themselves.  Very few international, humanitarian-oriented organizations garnered 
access to Iraq before 2003, one of the most notable being the International Committee 
for the Red Cross (ICRC).  Establishing offices in 1980, the ICRC circumvented what 
was otherwise a largely antagonistic Iraqi state towards foreign involvement.  By 
forging bonds both within the broader state apparatus, specifically governmental 
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armed and security forces, and on the ground through tribal, community, and religious 
figures, the ICRC emerged as the preeminent international organization with 
established ties to the Iraqi government and a consistent track record of implementing 
beneficial humanitarian projects throughout the country (‘The ICRC In Iraq’).  The 
outset of American military invasion, however, catalyzed an unprecedented influx of 
international NGOs in Iraq.  Between 2003 and 2004 witnessed large numbers of 
international organizations, mainly European or American, establish offices in Iraq and 
provide essential services to an Iraqi population entrenched in dire humanitarian 
crises.  Yet, rather quickly, two severe issues arose threatening both the state of 
international NGOs operating in Iraq and their crucial partnerships formed with their 
Iraqi, nation-based counterparts.  Despite the rather positive expectations of the CPA 
and broader US Department of Defense in regards to successfully implementing an 
operative, functional Iraqi government equipped to handle the inevitable violence and 
uncertainty once the Ba’ath regime was deposed, the overwhelmingly violent security 
situation that quickly consumed Iraq shortly after invasion, characterized most 
prominently by insurgent armed groups and a subsequent counterinsurgency, emerged 
as a severe threat to both international and nation-based NGOs.  In fact, between the 
summer and autumn months of 2004, all international NGOs evacuated their non-Iraqi 
employees from Iraq due to security concerns (Genot 17).  Even the long established 
ICRC evacuated its staff, which signaled a particularly alarming message to the broader 
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international humanitarian community.  Establishing offices in mainly nearby Jordan or 
Kuwait, many of these international NGOs would operate long-distance with Iraqi 
employees still on the ground, or form partnerships with nation-based NGOs that 
would subsequently implement the international NGOs’ projects.  While several of 
these organizations would ultimately return several years following 2004, security 
continued to prove a persistent issue, in turn creating a necessity for international 
NGOs to rely on contracting private security companies to protect them, a service both 
extremely costly and difficult for organizations to navigate.  From this conundrum 
arose another pressing issue: the blurring of humanitarian and military lines.  As Genot 
argues, Iraqi insurgent groups and the broader Iraqi population perceived many foreign 
humanitarian actors were either associated or aligned with American military forces, in 
turn situating “international NGOs as prisoners of the American will of subordination 
and control” (16).  In my interview with Professor Thomas Weiss of the Graduate 
Center at the City University of New York, a scholar who has extensively studied the 
concept of humanitarian and military relationships, he argued that during the Iraq War, 
humanitarian actors from international NGOs were widely perceived as extensions of 
the American military, which consequently compromised much of their intended 
actions and situated them in precarious positions in regards to security (Weiss, 
November 3rd).  Further, a disconnect arose between how the foreign humanitarian 
actors perceived themselves, presumably as benevolent actors who were largely critical 
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of the CPA’s handling of the humanitarian crises unfolding in Iraq, and how they were 
perceived by Iraqi civilians, many of whom believed foreign humanitarian workers to 
be highly partial to American and Western interests (Weiss).  These complicated 
concepts, the necessity for international NGOs during the Iraq War to rely on private 
security companies for protection, commonly termed “the armed humanitarian”, as 
well as the blurring of lines between humanitarian and military forces, consequently 
created an inhospitable atmosphere for foreign humanitarian organizations to operate 
in, which, as I will argue, allowed for nation-based, Iraqi organizations to emerge as 
crucial actors in a newly formed civil society. 
The Security Variable 
The severe security crisis that arose in Iraq during the American military 
occupation is an additional variable of crucial importance when conceptualizing both 
the successes and failures of the Iraqi NGO sector.  As will be more thoroughly argued 
in the security chapter, the policies implemented by both ORHA (Office of 
Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance) and the later established CPA (Coalition 
Provisional Authority) were structured in such a way that unleashed unprecedented 
violence within the country, in turn exacerbating already existing tensions amongst 
Iraqi society and contributing significantly to sectarian violence.  From this, three 
aspects of the devolved security situation throughout American military occupation can 
22 
 
be extrapolated as profound influences on the Iraqi NGO sector: American-contracted 
private security companies, insurgent groups, and the counterinsurgent policies 
employed by the foreign coalition.  All of these forces interacted in multiple ways to 
hinder the collective progress of the nation-based sector, while simultaneously situating 
said sector at a particular importance given the broader Iraqi and coalition 
governments’ inability to address the increasing number of humanitarian crises that 
mounted throughout the occupation period.  
Structural Forces on the Iraqi NGO Sector 
Almost immediately after American military forces entered Iraq in 2003, the 
eradication of Hussein created a space more welcoming for international NGOS to 
operate within, as well as for several thousand newly formed Iraqi-NGOs to emerge. 
Within the first three years of American military occupation in Iraq, 2003-2006, over ten 
thousand nation-based NGOs were either registered or awaiting registration. (Genot 
12)  One of the main contributing factors to the dramatic emergence of nation-based 
NGOs was the the large amount of funding, mainly from American and Western 
sources, provided for the building of an Iraqi civil society.  In fact, the US Congress 
allocated approximately three billion dollars for “development” at the beginning of the 
reconstruction period, while several million dollars in alternate funding stemmed from 
other coalition governments, namely the United Kingdom, other European Union 
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countries, and Japan. (Genot 18)  This three billion dollars from US government sources 
was but a small sliver of a much grander $50 billion allocated by the United States 
Congress, which was ultimately packaged as the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund. 
(IRRF) As will be argued in later chapters, the purpose of much of this funding towards 
the construction of an Iraqi civil society was enveloped within an idea of strategic 
foreign policy interest.  Genot claims: “donors’ interest was that financing the 
emergence of a civil society in Iraq would act as a medication for regional issues” 
(20).  With the ability to craft not only a new Iraqi government but a civil society 
modeled after and positioned in favor towards US and broader Western interests, 
copious funding was fueled towards a reconstruction project geared for presumed 
success.  Yet, very quickly, both funding sources and the broader Iraqi reconstruction 
project proved flimsy and unsustainable.  Within the first several years of American 
military occupation, the US Department of Defense, in its annual report released in 
2010, claimed that it was “unable to properly account for $8.7 billion of the $9.1 billion it 
received’ to implement effective reconstruction projects in Iraq”. (Genot 22)  Much of 
this inefficiency stemmed from a lack of accountability and follow-up.  For example, 
enormous amounts were given to certain Iraqi organizations for relatively inexpensive 
events, such as conferences and training sessions, that ultimately proved ineffective in 
terms of progress and equipping Iraqi humanitarian workers with necessary skills to 
face the crises unfolding in the country.  Hasham al-Assaf, the Iraqi Coordinator of the 
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NGOs Coordination Committee for Iraq, argues that the American-sponsored funding 
directed towards Iraqi-initiated reconstruction projects consequently “spoiled the Iraqi 
communities” by reflecting little interest in ensuring funding’s proper implementation 
and monitoring the ways in which money was being used (al-Assaf interview).  Thus, 
from the beginning of the CPA’s reconstruction project, a poorly structured platform for 
effecting meaningful humanitarian change profoundly shaped newly-formed Iraqi 
NGOs ability to work legitimately in their communities.   
Another issue related to funding that emerged rather quickly during the 
reconstruction period was the sense of dependency many Iraqi NGOs developed upon 
funding sources.  Considerable academic literature explores this concept in a variety of 
contexts, specifically in developing countries where Iraqi-based NGOs face a variety of 
structural, political, and economic obstacles when trying to operate 
successfully.  Ronelle Burger and Trudy Owens have argued that in certain African 
countries the amount of funding received stands as the most indicative factor of a non-
governmental organization’s success and sustainability (1284).  Further, larger NGOs 
that have developed close, consistent relationships with prominent funding sources, 
such as governmental aid agencies and prominent international NGOs, not only possess 
a higher probability of survival, they are as more likely to receive funding from said 
funding sources in the future, even if they contain a track-record of not implementing 
successful, efficient projects within their targeted communities (Burger and Owens 
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1292).   While it is certainly unsurprising that these organizations receive less funding 
from governmental and foreign sources, they have a significantly lower likelihood of 
obtaining any funding whatsoever, consequently situating them in a vicious cycle that 
prevents them from obtaining adequate funding, which in turn perpetuates their 
inability to perform intended projects and establish partnerships with larger 
organizations with funding capabilities.  As Genot explains, the international 
community stands as the predominate source of funding in Iraq, despite the fact that 
very few Iraqi NGOs actually receive financial support from these sources. (23)  Thus, 
in a context in which international humanitarian interest in Iraq is steadily decreasing - 
for a variety of reasons but primarily given the complicated security situation and the 
official removal of American military forces in late 2011- the dependencies restricting 
many Iraqi NGOs continues to harm and prevent progress.  While I therefore argue the 
American military invasion in 2003 and the subsequent eradication of the Hussein 
regime catalyzed the formation of a newly conceived Iraqi NGO sector to emerge, much 
of the implementation of the CPA-led reconstruction project, along with the presence of 
a highly controversial US military presence, compromised the health and growth of 
many Iraqi NGOs.   
NGOs as an Indicator of Civil Society 
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On a broader level, this project aims to capture, however restrictively, the ability 
of Iraq’s civil society to function both because of and in spite of a significant military 
occupation spanning almost a decade.  Why have humanitarian-oriented, Iraqi NGOs 
been selected as an appropriate tool to gauge Iraq’s larger civil society?  Non-
governmental organizations are quickly associated with the term civil society, almost 
blindly so.  Because so much of Iraq’s infrastructure was destroyed from the onset of 
military invasion, the rapid emergence of an Iraqi NGO sector was one of the few 
variables indicative of a civil society, in whatever capacity, functioning despite the 
omnipresent destruction throughout the country, specifically those with humanitarian 
focuses.  Further, many policy makers and academics assess the health of a country’s 
civil society by measuring the number of functional NGOs within a specific area.  
Humanitarian-oriented NGOs, rather than all non-profit organization, as the focus of 
this study serves to concentrate what is otherwise a varied, diverse Iraqi NGO sector 
encompassing a range of organizations. By examining humanitarian-oriented, nation-
based NGOs this study can more accurately assess the larger picture of Iraq’s civil 
society during the military occupation period.   
Ultimately, this study aims to categorize Iraqi humanitarian-oriented NGOs as 
highly pivotal forces for the well-being of Iraq’s political and humanitarian needs.  This 
introduction has briefly outlined the modern history of civil society organizations in 
Iraq, as well as introduced several variables that influenced the formation and operation 
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of humanitarian-oriented, Iraqi NGOs during American military occupation.  The 
following chapters will more thoroughly examine the effects of international NGOs, the 
security crisis, and Iraqi NGO structure on the Iraqi NGO sector during US military 




CHAPTER TWO: Relationships with International NGOs 
 
 
Before delving into the specific context of Iraqi humanitarian-oriented, non-
governmental organizations during the 2003-2011 American military occupation, a 
foundation that explores the broad themes of international non-governmental 
organizations must be established.  This will more fully grasp the crucial relationships 
forged between nation-based and larger foreign NGOs during the occupation in 
Iraq.  These relationships, as mentioned briefly in the introduction, developed quickly 
into a co-dependent symbiosis, so that most nation-based NGOs had not only formed 
because of copious foreign monetary and logistical support, but the majority were 
entirely dependent upon it for everyday survival.  Further, due mainly to dwindling 
security capacities of both the American military and international humanitarian actors, 
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the necessity of either hiring Iraqi nationals to carry out the work of international NGOs 
on the ground or partnering with nation-based NGOs while operating from nearby 
countries (predominately Jordan, Kuwait, and Turkey) emerged rather quickly.  This 
phenomenon, coupled with the already tense relationship between military and civilian 
forces, consequently challenged many of the deeply entrenched principles of 
humanitarianism, namely neutrality and impartiality, that guide international NGOs 
within any context of operation.  This chapter will accordingly provide a brief 
background on the varying types of international NGOs, as well as the distinct 
principles that shape them, and the new trends that emerged amongst these 
organizations after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 and how they were 
incorporated into a “Global War on Terror” context.  Once this background has been 
established, a case study in Afghanistan will be used to illuminate the similar, albeit 
unique, situation of international NGOs operating in Iraq as they navigated a 
particularly new set of trials and situations.  And, lastly, the chapter will conclude with 
the specific ways in which international NGOs guided the formation and effectiveness 
of the Iraqi NGO sector. 
 
 International NGO Background 
The Overseas Development Institute estimates there are between 3000 and 4000 
Western non-governmental organizations that operate at an international level, most 
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constituting development organizations while others operate as “briefcase” NGOs, 
which fill specific technical niches and functions (“Humanitarian NGOs: Challenges 
and Trends” 1).  While the number of Western, internationally operating NGOs is rather 
large and continues to increase, there are few who carry tremendous clout and 
influence at political, policy, and economic levels, such as CARE (American), Medecins 
Sans Frontieres (Doctors Without Borders, French), Oxfam (British), World Vision 
(American), and Save the Children (British).  While these organizations have home 
bases in their respective founding countries, they operate internationally vis-à-vis a 
multitude of national offices across the globe.  For example, Save the Children functions 
primarily from its London, UK office; however, thirty national Save the Children 
organizations serve as members of Save the Children International, a global network of 
NGOs that cooperate with over 120 governments where local partners operate 
(“Partnering with Save the Children”).  Western humanitarians typically delineate 
humanitarianism into three dominate strands: religious, “Dunanist”, and “Wilsonian” 
(“Humanitarian NGOs: Challenges and Trends” 1-2).  The religious strand, the oldest 
and most well- known, emerged from missionary work, although most religious NGOs 
today rarely proselytize and make a commitment to serving anyone despite their 
religious affiliation.  Some, however, such as World Vision, will only hire employees 
that identify with the organization’s religious principles.  The second strand, the 
Dunanist vision, receives its name from Red Cross founder Henry 
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Dunant.  Organizations that fall within this category, notably Save the Children and 
Oxfam, seek to situate themselves outside the purview of state interests (“Humanitarian 
NGOs: Challenges and Trends” 2).  The third strand of Western humanitarian action is 
Wilsonian, named after American president Woodrow Wilson, who believed American 
ideals could serve as a positive influence on a global level.  As the Humanitarian Policy 
Group describes, “the Wilsonian tradition sees a basic compatibility with humanitarian 
aims and US foreign policy objectives” (HPG 2).  An example of a Wilsonian non-
governmental organization is the American-based CARE, which originated as part of 
the Marshall Plan following the end of World War II to deliver assistance packages to 
Europeans negatively affected by the war.  From such a wide variety of humanitarian 
traditions emerges an even more acute separation amongst internationally operating 
NGOs, which are largely philosophical and logistical distinctions found between 
American and European organizations.  While many European organizations tend to 
receive less government funding, in turn allowing for more operational autonomy, 
American organizations are more deeply embedded within American policy and 
governmental circles.  Further, European NGOs engage more directly and openly in 
advocacy, while American organizations, generally, tend to adhere to a more ‘behind-
the-scenes’ approach when trying to influence policy decisions in the United States 
(“Humanitarian: Challenges and Trends” 2).  As will be seen later, the intersection of 
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policy and international NGO operations functioned significantly during American 
military occupation in Iraq. 
        Perhaps one of the most important concepts in understanding international 
NGOs as they navigated through the chaotic maze that was the humanitarian 
operational front during the American military occupation in Iraq is the fundamental 
shift in humanitarianism following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.  On a 
funding level, American NGOs in particular were financially harmed after the attacks, 
as funding from private donors drastically decreased and were subsequently targeted 
towards organizations focusing on the domestic victims of the attack. While private 
donations decreased, however, government funding towards humanitarian-oriented 
NGOs has been steadily increasing since the 1990s, but ultimately sky-rocketed after the 
September 11, 2001 attacks, a signifier of the increased relevance of NGOs as one of the 
most prominent humanitarian actors.  Yet, as mentioned above, American NGOs tend 
to have more of a dependence on government funding as opposed to their European 
counterparts, so within the post-9/11 context, an increased financial dependence led to a 
complicated situation for many American organizations as the US government initiated 
controversial wars in Afghanistan and Iraq in the early 2000s.  On the one hand, these 
wars necessitated the presence of humanitarian actors as Afghani and Iraqi 
infrastructures subsequently plummeted, while on the other hand they situated some of 
these organizations in uncomfortable positions as accepting government funding to 
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operate in an internationally contested war became increasingly awkward and 
compromising.  Save the Children US, along with several other notable American 
NGOs, however, resisted this prescription and announced that they would not receive 
funding from the US government for programs that arose in Iraq and the surrounding 
region after the 2003 American military invasion (“Humanitarian NGOs: Challenges 
and Trends” 3).  Another important emergence after the September 11, 2001 attacks for 
humanitarian actors, particularly within the Iraqi context, were the implications for 
religious organizations operating in distinctly religiopolitical environments.  For 
example, during the American military occupation in Iraq, Muslim humanitarian NGOs 
tended to face less of a security crisis as opposed to their non-religious and Christian 
counterparts, namely because they were not as rigidly associated with the foreign 
occupying powers.   
        Apart from new trends within the humanitarian sector post-September 11th as 
delineated above, more significant trends that deeply challenge the neutrality of 
humanitarian organizations have emerged since, arguably, the late 1980s and early 
1990s when American military and international civilian actors began to interact more 
closely in various humanitarian crises across the globe, notably Operation Support 
Hope in Rwanda (1992), Operation Provide Comfort in Iraqi Kurdistan (1991), and 
Operation Restore Hope in Somalia (1992).  Perhaps the most notable and prominent 
theme humanitarian actors have struggled with is the so-called “blurring of the lines” 
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between civilian and military actors during humanitarian crises.  Thomas Weiss has 
explored this topic extensively, particularly in his book Military-Civilian Interactions: 
Intervening in Humanitarian Crises, which argues that in addition to the already 
fundamental differences between humanitarian and military philosophies, 
humanitarian, specifically Western, personnel are increasingly associated with military 
forces on the ground by nationals.  This misrepresentation not only tarnishes many 
NGOs’ reputations in their communities of interest, but also creates a security hazard 
for humanitarian aid workers as they are believed to be associated with the military by 
insurgent groups in certain contexts (Ali and al-Juboori interviews).  In my interview 
with Professor Weiss, he discussed this phenomenon as it occurred overtime: 
In the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War, we witnessed an extension of the US 
military with, arguably, genuinely humanitarian justifications.  During this time, 
the UN and NGOs were not seen as extensions of a lethal and unproductive US 
presence; they were welcomed.  After the 2003 invasion there was a certain 
warmth in welcoming the Western-initiated overthrow of Saddam Hussein in 
Iraq.  However, as time went on, the US occupation was perceived as anything 
but humanitarian, and humanitarian civilians were perceived as an extension of 
US military forces.  Further, there was certainly a disconnect between how the 
humanitarians perceived themselves as civilian agents and how they were 
perceived on the ground.  
 
Thus, international humanitarian agents operating in war zones are increasingly 
associated with a foreign military presence, an association that creates turbulence 
between an already tense military/civilian partnership and stresses the traditionally 
neutral principles of humanitarians as they navigate the unabashedly political maze 
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that is cooperating with military forces, especially American ones.  Weiss goes on to 
claim in his interview that a ramification of this phenomenon is that humanitarian and 
military actors will be involved in “nicer” war zones, in which not only will the lines 
between both factions blur even further, but the very roles of both will witness a 
merging, so that the military will increasingly involve itself in more humanitarian tasks 
and humanitarian civilians will more commonly equip themselves with military 
weaponry, also termed “the armed humanitarian” and believed by many humanitarians 
to be a contradiction in terms (3 November 2014). 
        Another important phenomenon applicable in many geographical contexts but 
especially relevant in Iraq during the American military occupation is the increasingly 
politicized nature of humanitarianism, a philosophical shift that deeply challenges the 
traditional hallmarks of humanitarian action: humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and 
independence, as defined by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs (UNOCHA 1).  Many academics, policy makers, and aid workers have 
expressed outrage at the increasingly political nature of providing aid during 
humanitarian crises, beckoning a return to the simpler times of humanitarianism when 
the sector was supposedly not as entangled in a complicated political matrix (de 
Torrente).  What most would consider traditional humanitarianism, as concentrated 
most tellingly within such organizations as American CARE and British Oxfam, began 
largely in response to human crises caused by war.  Thus, humanitarian aid and 
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support from the early to mid-twentieth century sought not to take a definitive stance 
on an inherent justification or opposition to war, but to rather remedy and alleviate the 
suffering caused by it.  This seemingly apolitical approach, or political agnosticism as 
some critics have termed it, has ultimately been challenged as war zones within the past 
several decades have presented governments and aid workers alike with a newly 
constructed set of challenges in which the line separating apolitical humanitarianism 
and strictly militaristic government interference has become blurred.  
Some critics, however, argue that while the so-called politicization of 
humanitarianism certainly carries with it negative consequences, the assumption that 
humanitarianism is inherently apolitical is not only flawed but simply untrue and 
unrealistic (obvious examples of this would be the United States Department of Defense 
co-opting the humanitarian effort during the Iraq War through the construction of 
ORHA or the American military’s deliverance of assistance supplies during the war in 
Afghanistan on the condition that Afghani civilians provide American military officials 
with intelligence information).  In his article “Politicized Humanitarianism”, CARE 
advocacy coordinator Paul O’Brien challenges these traditional notions of 
humanitarianism, mainly neutrality and impartiality, and urges humanitarian 
organizations to fulfill a more political role in the aftermath of the wars in Afghanistan 
and Iraq.  In response to many international NGOs in Afghanistan refusing to cooperate 
with the National Solidarity Program (NSP) because the program was believed to 
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legitimize the central Afghani government, O’Brien argues: “NGOs that participate in 
such work cannot claim to be apolitical.  Rather, they need to understand and articulate 
how their political solidarity with the people they serve trumps any political obligations 
they may have to their donors or to the sovereign governments where they work”. 
(33)  Another crucial aspect of O’Brien’s argument is the connection he draws between 
the dwindling security situation for humanitarian workers, particularly in the Afghani 
and Iraqi contexts in which an unprecedented amount of foreign aid workers have lost 
their lives in the past decade, and the necessity of international NGOs to voice their 
opinion on the need of an increased security apparatus for all actors proving aid in war 
zone areas, an opinion that is inherently political and influential: ‘NGOs have been 
instrumental in keeping discussions alive on the need for greater international 
investment in security in Afghanistan….classic humanitarians should at least ask 
themselves whether their struggle to remain beyond politics shuts the door after the 
horse has bolted, leaving the barn inside burning’ (36).  O’Brien’s analysis meaningfully 
reflects the shifting nature of humanitarianism, a sector that, while originating and 
guided by principles that are pure at best and unrealistic at worst, operates increasingly 
in highly politicized and muddled environments, ultimately presenting humanitarian 
workers with situations that resist previously cemented notions of impartiality and 
neutrality and require new conceptualizations of navigating humanitarian challenges 




A Case Study: The War in Afghanistan 
A case-study approach to the challenges obstacles faced by international NGOs 
operating in Afghanistan during American military occupation from 2001 to 2014 will 
illuminate the similar yet unique trials international NGOs experienced in Iraq, 
ultimately establishing a comparative basis to conceptualize international NGO 
relationships with both their nation-based counterparts and military forces on a broader 
level.  Contrary to the Iraq War, the War in Afghanistan was initiated soon after the 
terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the American military invaded the country in an 
effort to remove al-Qaeda forces, the terrorist group assumed responsible for the attacks 
and extinguish the Taliban from political power.  Officially launched under Operation 
Enduring Freedom alongside the United Kingdom military, and later joined by 
alternate forces from the Northern Alliance, the United States and its allies successfully 
removed the Taliban from power and established a military presence throughout 
Afghanistan; however, few al-Qaeda and Taliban members were effectively detained, 
while most suspected members escaped to Pakistan or desolate mountain regions.  
        Similarly to the Iraq War, the international public opinion of the War in 
Afghanistan was largely negative, particularly as time went on and a definitive end to 
NATO military occupation of the country seemed less and less certain.  A 24-country 
PEW Global Attitudes survey in 2008 claimed that majority populations of 21 countries 
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desired NATO troops to leave Afghanistan immediately, while only three countries (the 
United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia) favored troops remaining in the 
country until the political and security situations had stabilized (“Views of the US”).  By 
2013, tens of thousands had lost their lives in the conflict.  Near to a thousand foreign 
soldiers and contractors (most of whom were predominately working for privatized 
security companies) were killed, while over ten thousand Afghan National Security 
Forces perished, as well as other several thousand Afghan civilian casualties. 
 Also in congruence to the situation in Iraq, the American and allied military 
invasion of Afghanistan catalyzed a severe humanitarian crisis, presenting foreign and 
nation-based aid workers with an unprecedented set of challenges that tenuously 
aligned with a poorly constructed military occupation, an environment that enabled the 
already shaky security situation to deteriorate and subsequently threaten the 
implementation of humanitarian aid throughout the country.  While there were more 
functional humanitarian-oriented, non-governmental organizations in Afghanistan than 
in Iraq during the countries’ respective American military occupations, Afghanistan 
currently stands as the most dangerous country in the world for aid agencies, both 
nation-based and international, to operate: attacks against non-governmental 
organizations and their workers have increased by 1300% since the early 1990s to 2005 
(Glacius, Kaldor, Anheier 432).  Most of the aid workers killed in these attacks were 
Afghanis, which challenges the common assumption within the humanitarian sector 
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that the aid workers more at risk are foreigners, not the nationals normally hired to 
carry out an international NGO’s efforts on the ground (due to the assumption that they 
are less of a target than foreigners, who are easily associated with occupying powers by 
militia and insurgent groups).  Two major problems international humanitarian aid 
workers faced during American military occupation in Afghanistan were, similarly to 
the issues outlined previously in regards to the NGO sector in Iraq, were the conflation 
between military and humanitarian forces on the ground and a reconceptualization of 
the notion of “impartiality” as an infallible pillar of international humanitarian aid 
organizations operating within a highly contested military occupation.   
 As explained above, the so-called “blurring of the lines” phenomenon between 
military and civilian forces has occurred repeatedly in humanitarian crises on a global 
scale, beginning arguably in the late 1980s and more consistently throughout the 1990s.  
While there are a variety of explanations for this merging of actors, a driving force 
catalyzing an increased ‘humanitarian’ edge to military, specifically American military, 
agendas is fundamentally of a strategic nature.  Laura Olson, in her article on 
humanitarian spaces in Afghanistan, explains: “humanitarian assistance to win ‘hearts 
and minds’ is provided directly by military forces, as in other conflict settings, primarily 
for instrumental reasons-  force protection, enabling intelligence gathering, and helping 
ease acceptance of troops”(4).  Further, while the pivotal role of the United Nations in 
implementing projects to ease the formation of new political institutions and guiding 
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nascent development processes successfully should not be minimized, the colossal 
presence of the United States in foreign aid and humanitarian assistance must be 
stressed.  For example, the perceived cooptation of the humanitarian sphere by 
American military forces was further exacerbated by the dominance of monetary aid 
from the United States.  International donors pledged approximately $20.5 billion in 
aid, with the United States considerably the largest donor, followed by the World Bank, 
the Asian Development Bank, and the European Commission (Olson 5).  While 
significant in quantity, the subject of the implementation of foreign aid in Afghanistan 
was highly contested and controversial, spurring numerous reports throughout the 
Afghan government that aid was being squandered by foreign agencies, in addition to 
the most qualified and desirable Afghan employees being lured to work for said 
agencies because of lucrative salaries while crucial job positions in the newly formed 
Afghan government were left unfilled (Olson 19).  These aforementioned factors, in 
addition to many Afghani civilians receiving aid- even aid from the largely criticized, 
American military-operated PRTs (Provincial Reconstruction Teams)- contributed to a 
growing sense amongst international NGOs operating in the war-torn country that their 
humanitarian efforts were being compromised by similar, albeit highly motivated, 
humanitarian acts by the United States military.  
 Another negative element of the experience of many international NGOs 
operating in Afghanistan during American military occupation was the growing 
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realization that the traditionally lauded principles of humanitarianism, namely 
neutrality and impartiality, were being challenged, if not blatantly confronted.  Olson 
clams, “Anyone on the side of stability and recovery is seen as a political ally of the 
government and its foreign partners….NGOs argue that OEF’s and ISAF’s use of aid 
and role of reconstruction has eroded the neutral ‘humanitarian space’ necessary to 
effectively meet civilian needs and suffering in this situation” (24).  Consistent with the 
“blurring of the lines” phenomenon outlined above for both Afghani and Iraqi contexts, 
the cooptation of reconstruction and development during an occupation period by 
foreign military forces draws all foreign actors-importantly foreign humanitarian 
actors- into a political realm in which the ability of neutral humanitarianism to function 
is severely compromised. 
 
The International and Iraqi NGO Relationship  
The final section of this chapter examines the general experiences of 
international, largely Western, NGOs that operated in Iraq during American military 
occupation from 2003-2011.  Extrapolated from these general experiences are three 
broad themes that resonate widely across the NGO sector active in Iraq during the 
aforementioned timeframe and indicate a drastically altered humanitarian sphere for 
aid workers to work within: the compromising of humanitarian goals by American 
military strategy and policy, a deteriorating security situation that cultivated numerous 
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obstacles for international NGOs, and a new space for nation-based and Iraqi partner 
NGOs to thrive due to international NGOs operating from neighboring countries.   
These three variables interacted in such a way that the newly formed Iraqi NGO sector 
was compromised in its functionality due to a deplorable security and policy context, 
but also situated the sector at a paramount importance as international NGOs and the 
interim Iraqi government proved inept at addressing the country’s humanitarian crisis. 
 Similarly to the “blurring of the lines” phenomenon described above in both the 
Afghani and more international context, international NGOs newly settled in Iraq 
during American military occupation were forced to grapple with a conflation of their 
identities and purposes with those of the United States military forces working beside 
them.  This assimilation stemmed from several reasons, one being that the American 
military initiated several humanitarian-oriented projects, oftentimes coopting the 
personnel and resources of international NGOs to assist them. (Genot 16)  Further, due 
to a severely devolved security situation, many international NGOs were essentially 
forced to work with military and coalition actors, to some extent, to effectively carry out 
their humanitarian tasks.  While many international NGOs, particularly European ones, 
insisted on maintaining a sense of independence separate from the American military 
and private security forces that encouraged cooperation, several American NGOs 
developed close working relationships with American military, CPA, and private 
security company forces to facilitate a supposedly safer working environment, as well 
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as better implement project tasks.  For example, some international NGOs would use 
military escorts to carry out projects in remote or unfamiliar areas. (Genot 16)  These 
close relationships, while certainly seen as necessary for some international NGOs 
weary of hostile insurgent forces, fostered a conflation of military and civilian forces on 
the ground in the eyes of Iraqis, so that the entirety of foreign forces oftentimes 
belonged to a conglomerate of suspect occupiers, subsequently tarnishing the 
reputation of many international NGOs and endangering Western organizations as they 
were seen as “appropriate targets” by armed groups fighting foreign occupation. 
(Genot 16) 
 Another important element that greatly influenced the operation level of 
international NGOs and the subsequent shift in their relationship with their nation-
based, Iraqi counterparts was an increasingly devolved security situation, which 
prompted most foreign organizations to evacuate Iraq and operate from neighboring 
countries, largely Jordan and Kuwait.  This exodus was especially pronounced between 
late 2003 and 2004 in which all but a select few international NGOs evacuated Iraq.  By 
2005, only sixty international NGOs had returned and continued operation, despite a 
worsening security context and decreased funding and international attention towards 
Iraq. This movement had a profound impact on the status of Iraqi NGOs, as the absence 
of foreign humanitarian organizations within the country crafted an unprecedented 
space for a relatively newly formed Iraqi NGO sector to operate without a direct 
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Western NGO presence.  Further, many Western NGOs operating from nearby 
countries relied heavily upon Iraqi NGOs to carry out projects on the ground in Iraq; 
these partnerships facilitated a sense of cooperation necessary to address humanitarian 
concerns, effectively combining the local knowledge of Iraqi NGOs with the more 
experienced resources and technical skills of their Western counterparts.   
This so-called “remote management”, in which Western NGOs focusing their 
humanitarian efforts on Iraqi populations were located in separate countries, relied 
upon a variety of factors and existed in multiple variations.  As Genot argues, two 
crucial elements of the relationships forged between international and nation-based 
NGOs was “the distance of decision makers from the field and the channeling of 
responsibilities to local actors”, yet these elements were situated within a wide 
spectrum of relationships, so that some international NGOs established significant and 
solidified partnerships with Iraqi NGOs while others relied on sub-contracting with 
either a nation-based organization or local actors employed by the international 
organization (32).  What remains paramount in regards to these complicated 
relationships, however, is the increased significance of local Iraqi actors in the 
humanitarian cause afflicting the country during American military occupation.  A 
decreased collection of foreign funding coupled with a progressively frightening 
security situation catalyzed a mass exodus of international NGOs from Iraq, in turn 







CHAPTER THREE: The Security Crisis 
  
The severe security crisis that arose in Iraq during the American military 
occupation created a paradoxical environment for Iraqi humanitarian-oriented, non-
governmental organizations in which their effectiveness was negatively impacted while 
the very presence of an Iraqi NGO sector, unprecedented in its size and capacity, was 
situated at a new importance.  This security crisis was in part catalyzed by the highly 
contested and controversial foreign occupiers that included not only Western military 
actors, but also private security companies contracted to carry out a variety of tasks on 
the ground, personnel from the United Nations, and, as mentioned in the previous 
chapter, Western humanitarian aid workers who were oftentimes associated with the 
occupying powers.  ORHA (Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance) and 
the later established CPA’s (Coalition Provisional Authority) subsequent policies 
implemented throughout Iraq that attempted to create a functional democratic 
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government from the ground exacerbated the dissatisfaction amongst Iraqi civilians, a 
dissatisfaction that steadily worsened as the American military occupation increasingly 
proved haphazard and ill-equipped to handle the political, economic, and societal 
destruction caused by its invasion.  This sense of frustration pervasive throughout Iraqi 
society incited by American military occupation contributed to the growing unrest 
amongst Iraqi civilians, which ultimately manifested in heavily armed and retaliating 
insurgent groups.   
Under President Saddam Hussein’s Ba’ath regime, the Sunni minority 
monopolized the majority of powerful government positions, in turn largely rejecting 
the Shia majority from obtaining too much power within the Iraqi republic.  Once 
Western military forces swiftly eradicated Hussein from his authoritarian position in 
2003 and subsequently initiated a series of de-Ba’thification policies, purging significant 
portions of Iraqi government workers from their positions (despite the fact that all 
government workers under Hussein’s rule were required to pledge allegiance to the 
Ba’ath party), intense pressure was placed on occupying powers and newly ordained 
Iraqi leaders to include an appropriate proportion of Shia representatives in the new 
Iraqi government, as well as members from the multitude of minorities in Iraq, notably 
the Kurds residing in the country’s north.  This conundrum of crafting a new 
government structure accommodating the diverse sects of populations throughout Iraq 
that had historically been expunged from wielding any sort of political power, coupled 
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with an unprecedented sense of anger and exasperation amongst Iraqis as their 
economic and societal infrastructure crumbled, contributed to growing numbers of 
insurgent groups that posed an unexpected threat for American military forces and, 
pertinent to this paper, the humanitarian sector operating in Iraq.   
As the security situation worsened and international NGOs increasingly 
terminated their projects or flocked to neighboring countries, Iraqi humanitarian-
oriented NGOs were left with a disheartening and puzzling maze to navigate.  It is 
crucial to emphasize the relatively new presence of NGOs in Iraq post-2003.  While a 
considerably prominent NGO culture existed in Iraqi Kurdistan in the north, the 
majority of nation-based NGOs that existed in the middle and southern regions of Iraq 
during American military occupation were created post-invasion, a phenomenon that 
will be explored more thoroughly in the following chapter.  With decreasing funding 
and, for many organizations, poorly structured programs and rampant corruption, 
implementing useful and meaningful projects amidst a deplorable security environment 
became less and less accessible for nation-based NGOs.  As discussed in the previous 
chapter, the security situation, which drove out significant numbers of international 
NGOs, elevated the significance of Iraqi humanitarian aid workers and the newly 
formed nation-based NGOs that were mainly concentrated in the Kurdish north but 
had meaningful presences throughout the country, ultimately establishing NGOs as 
forceful actors within Iraq’s reconfigured civil society.  Thus, this chapter focuses on the 
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effects of the security situation in Iraq, beginning with the American military invasion 
on the occupied country’s nascent NGO sector.  Beginning with a brief historical 
background that explores ORHA/CPA’s policies and other factors that contributed to 
the devolving security crisis on a regional basis, the chapter will consider the major 
actors that influenced the effectiveness of Iraqi NGOs.  By examining American-
contracted private security companies, insurgent groups, and the counterinsurgent 
policies employed by the foreign coalition, the chapter frames these three variables as 
crucial forces in shaping Iraq’s humanitarian-oriented NGOs.  While there are certainly 
numerous other factors that contributed to the devolved security crisis present 
throughout military occupation, many of which had combined effects on Iraqi society 
and in turn present difficulties in extrapolating concise causal connections, the three 
outlined factors had distinct impacts on the Iraqi NGO sector.  Thus, the unique 
position of private security companies and the combined effects of insurgent and 
counterinsurgent groups reflect two common themes significant throughout this 
project: while American-contracted private security companies aggravated the already 
present ‘blurring of the lines’ phenomenon between military and civilian forces, the 
highly pervasive insurgent violence-and the largely unsuccessful counterinsurgent 
response-both incited and exacerbated sectarian tensions within Iraqi society, ultimately 




The Pentagon established the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian 
Assistance in January of 2003, a mere two months before the official entrance of military 
boots, and was staffed by personnel from the US Departments of State, Defense, Justice, 
Energy, Treasury and Agriculture, all whom reported to US Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld and saw Ret. Lt. General Jay Garner as director (Ehrenberg, 
McSherry, Sanchez, Sayej 163).  American government officials anticipated the 
reconstruction period to be brief, successful, and warmly accepted by Iraqi society, yet 
the unrealistic sense of optimism and severely lacking foresight fueled disastrous 
consequences as ORHA began its work in 2003:  
The administration’s failure to consider other possibilities stemmed from its 
conviction that overwhelming military power would allow it to unilaterally fight 
a preemptive war without negative consequences….The administration’s 
ideological blinkers had convinced policymakers that the United States was the 
only actor whose actions had to be considered (Ehrenberg, McSherry, Sanchez, Sayej 
164). [emphasis added]  
The ideological principles masking the more complicated intentions of the Bush 
administration in deciding to invade Iraq (a controversial topic not explored in this 
paper but certainly important to consider throughout) constructed Iraq as a country 
entrenched within an almost backwards political environment in need of dire saving 
from the ‘freedom-loving’ United States.  President George W. Bush proudly 
proclaimed in a speech announcing the end of major combat operations in Iraq that, 
We have fought for the cause of liberty, and for the peace of the world….In the 
images of celebrating Iraqis, we have also seen the ageless appeal of human 
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freedom….Everywhere that freedom arrives, humanity rejoices; and everywhere 
that freedom stirs, let tyrants fear (‘Major Combat Operations in Iraq Have 
Ended’).   
 
The alignment of these glowing principles with the subsequent policies of the CPA (the 
interim government that very quickly replaced ORHA in 2003) was unstable at best, as 
the timeline to implement intended reconstruction and humanitarian projects quickly 
extended to an unforeseeable termination point.  In addition to the dramatic removal of 
Garner with L. Paul Bremer and the disastrous coordination with American-selected 
Ahmed Chalabi (an Iraqi exile, largely considered an opportunist, who was briefly 
considered by Washington to lead Iraq following American military removal), the 
CPA’s most controversial and, arguably, most disastrous policy was de-Ba’athification.  
On April 16, 2003, Bremer announced the establishment of the policy, claiming: ‘This 
order implements the declaration by eliminating the [Ba’ath] party’s structures and 
removing its leadership from positions of authority and responsibility in Iraqi society’ 
(CPA Order Number 1).  While not all members of the Ba’ath party were eradicated 
from their government positions, the order demanded the immediate removal of all 
senior members, additionally preventing them from any future employment in the Iraqi 
government (Bremer 1).  Further, government employees within the ‘top three layers of 
management in every national government ministry, affiliated corporations and other 
government institutions’ were interviewed in order to determine if they were ‘full 
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members’ of the Ba’ath party, and, if deemed to so, faced the same fate as their 
counterparts residing at the highest government echelons (Bremer 1).  Following this, 
the so-called ‘dissolution of entities’ expunged most government ministries (notably the 
entirety of the Iraqi army, Ministry of Defense, the Iraqi Intelligence Service, and 
multiple organizations associated with the former Ba’ath party), effectively eliminating 
innumerable swaths of Iraqi government workers, adding dramatic pressure to an 
already catastrophic unemployment environment (CPA Order Number 2).   
 On a more general level, the effectiveness of the CPA and broader American 
military occupation proved disastrously negative.  As the director of policy planning for 
the CPA, Andrew Rathmell argues, ‘the CPA ended up creating nation-building 
institutions on the run, governing Iraq at all levels, supporting a counterinsurgency 
campaign [and] reforming and reconstructing Iraqi state institutions’ with a lack of 
thoroughness and foresight required of transforming Iraq into the ‘model democracy’ 
envisioned by Washington (1014). Further, Bremer’s striking policy decisions had a 
profoundly negative impact amongst Iraqi civilians.  As the CPA continued to prove 
inept and slow at implementing its stated reconstruction policies, the growing sense of 
frustration amongst Iraqis ultimately manifested most prominently in armed insurgent 
groups, the most violent of which were located in the predominately Shi’a southern 
region of Iraq.  The counterinsurgency response of the American military served to 
largely intensify this frustration, resulting in even more insurgent groups and more 
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violent displays of dissatisfaction against the occupying forces.  Particularly after media 
leaks of the gruesome, dehumanizing treatment of detained Iraqi civilians at Abu 
Gharib prison by American soldiers, international horror and admonishment towards 
the military occupation of Iraq heightened.  Progressively, the occupation seemed more 
and more complicit in violent atrocities committed by both foreign and Iraqi actors.  In 
addition to the surge of murders, kidnappings, and physical and sexual abuse against 
Iraqis at the time, strikingly public terrorist attacks expressed a strongly rooted 
opposition against foreign occupation .  One of the most prominent of these attacks was 
the August 19, 2003 bombing of the Canal Hotel where the United Nations 
headquarters were located, killing twenty-two people, including UN Special 
Representative Sergio Vieria de Mello, and wounding over a hundred others.   
 The security situation, while generally deplorable throughout the entirety of Iraq, 
was distinct in its severity depending on the region.  The northern Kurdish region of 
Iraq, culturally and politically distinct from the rest of the country even before the 
removal of Saddam Hussein from power, retained its sense of autonomy and relative 
stability compared to its neighboring regions, even containing its own regional 
government that operated largely separately from the central Ba’ath party in Baghdad.  
Following the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Iraqi Kurdistan was protected by a no-fly 
zone following US-led Operation Provide Comfort, which protected and assisted 
fleeing Kurdistan civilians escaping Hussein’s vengeance.  Since then and throughout 
53 
 
the military occupation, Kurdistan and the United States remained allies, so when the 
reconfiguring of Iraq’s government began in 2003, the Kurds expected a generous 
position in the newly formed political apparatus and favorable representation in the 
parliament (Ehrenberg, McSherry, Sanchez, Sayej 324).  By 2006, Kurds, despite their 
minority status, proved one of the most vocal of the ethnic groups as the political 
process slugged forward, ultimately establishing a unification agreement in January of 
2006 proclaiming the ‘basis of partnership, consensus and equity’ between Kurdistan’s 
two major political parties, the KDP (Kurdistan Democratic Party) and the PUK 
(Patriotic Union for Kurdistan), which had historically been highly frictional with one 
another (Kurdistan Regional Government Unification Agreement).  While violence and 
economic challenges persisted continuously throughout the occupation, the Kurdish 
region enjoyed a sense of stability uncommon compared to the rest of the country.  For 
example, the middle region encompassing Iraq’s capital Baghdad, which experienced 
some of the most concentrated shocks of violence, faced starkly different circumstances 
compared to its northern counterpart.  Not under a mandated-no-fly zone and 
containing the majority of foreign military forces, Iraq’s capital and surrounding areas 
experienced devastating destruction.  From the outset of the military invasion in 2003, 
Extensive US military bombing and the subsequent unraveling of Iraqi infrastructure 
caused unprecedented levels of chaos and looting, as most former government 
buildings, including government-administrated museums housing priceless artifacts 
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from historical Mesopotamia, were ransacked by angry civilians.  As detailed by Anne 
Garrels, a NPR foreign correspondent and one of the few international journalists 
documenting the war in the early years of American military occupation, in her book 
Naked in Baghdad, the enormity of destruction unleashed by American bombings and the 
subsequent civilian chaos it catalyzed on the ground quickly revealed Iraq’s longtime 
cultural, political, and economic center was inching towards ruin: 
They [American occupying forces]…were afraid of the looting, which we all saw 
happen. They were afraid of a security vacuum, which we all saw happen. They 
were afraid that their society would fragment, which we have seen happen. They 
were afraid that the U.S. would not be able to control this beast that they knew 
very well — themselves (48). 
Iraq’s southern, predominately Shia, region, also experienced alarming levels of unrest 
and destruction, although its unique position as the cradle of a strongly pro-Shia power 
struggle exacerbated sectarian tensions that leveraged ethno-religious identities at an 
increasingly alarming level as the occupation continued.  As detailed in the 2006 Iraq 
Study Group, a bipartisan cohort of American politicians mandated by Congress to 
critically examine the devolving security situation in Iraq, four of Iraq’s eighteen 
provinces (Anbar, Baghdad, Diyala, and Salah ad Din) were deemed ‘highly insecure’ 
and largely sectarian in nature: ‘Iraq is in the grip of a deadly cycle…Sunni insurgent 
attacks spark largescale Shia reprisals, and vice versa….In some parts of Iraq-notably 
Baghdad-sectarian cleansing is taking place’ (506).  With the expulsion of Hussein and 
the majority of his Ba’ath regime, which had tightly suppressed any sort of political 
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resistance, the ethnic mosaic of Iraq’s population witnessed catastrophic internal 
conflicts as each group leveraged its identity to express collective grievances from the 
past and claim a stake in Iraq’s political future.  Thus, much of the security situation 
encompassing Iraq’s nascent yet crucial humanitarian sector was initiated by the 
American military invasion, but ultimately propelled by the conflict’s ethnically 
sectarian qualities.  As will be examined more thoroughly in the following pages, this 
sectarianism fundamentally characteristic of the violence throughout the occupation 
deeply challenged the principles of impartiality and neutrality newly formed Iraqi 
NGOs were expected to embrace. 
Now that a historical context has been established outlining major policies 
implemented by both ORHA and CPA, which were predominately poorly planned and 
negatively received by Iraqi civilians, the three variables stated in this chapter’s 
introduction-- American-contracted private security companies, insurgent groups, and 
counterinsurgency-oriented military policies—can be explored as fundamental security 
forces shaping Iraq’s humanitarian sector.  The first group of actors is the controversial 
collection of private, mostly American, security companies contracted by the United 
States to facilitate significant portions of the CPA’s projects and goals.  As will be 
argued later, the privatization of considerable portions of the reconstruction in Iraq, 
which ultimately created tension throughout the humanitarian sector operating in the 
country, had negative consequences on the ability of Iraqi NGOs to effectively carry out 
56 
 
their missions and projects in their respective communities.  The second group of actors 
is the complex assortment of Iraqi insurgent groups that formed quickly after American 
military invasion and constituted a wide spectrum of ideologies, levels and expressions 
of violence, and ethno-religious make-up.  While this paper is too brief to adequately 
consider the complicated nature and breadth of these groups, they are crucial to the 
understanding of Iraq’s unique security environment, which very quickly became 
characterized by inter-warring militant factions that threatened the stability of Iraq’s 
NGO sector.  The final group of actors is the reactionary counterinsurgent groups, that 
arguably failed to mitigate the political turmoil plaguing Iraq, instead exacerbating it.  
While a multitude of other actors were crucial in shaping the security situation 
surrounding Iraq’s humanitarian sector during American military occupation, the 
above three are most outstanding in their most immediate and lasting effects on said 
sector’s ability to operate. 
The Employment of Private Security Companies 
Much literature, both academic and policy-oriented in nature, has been produced 
since the military invasion of Iraq criticizing the considerably privatized nature of Iraq’s 
occupation, encapsulated most prominently by American-owned private security 
companies.  For example, Spearin explores the unlikely interaction of NGO and private 
actors in the Iraqi context, warning of the potentially disastrous outcomes of the two 
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fundamentally oppositional sectors operating in the same humanitarian crisis space 
(24).  In a similar vein, Bjork and Jones position themselves in a more overtly critical 
stance, claiming the interactions between private security companies and humanitarian-
oriented NGOs oftentimes creates violence, consequently necessitating the 
establishment of distinctly separate intentions between the two sectors in order for 
humanitarians to avoid confusion amongst the communities they seek to help (777).   
Despite the effects of the privatization of security in Iraq, the sheer numbers are 
telling: by 2008, the US Department of Defense had contracted an astonishing 155, 826 
contractors to facilitate and implement reconstruction activities on the ground, 
surpassing the 152,725 American troops on the ground (Dunigan 1).  While the use of 
private security contractors is certainly not a new phenomenon in American wars 
(Vietnam serving as a notable example), the quantity and range of responsibilities 
allotted to these companies in the most recent war in Iraq stands as remarkably 
unprecedented.  The introduction of private security companies into the Iraqi 
occupation created a variety of complications that transcended traditional conflicts 
expected between foreign, occupying military powers and local civilians.  For example, 
the legal accountability of private contractors in the Iraqi context remained nebulous 
and difficult to ascertain, specifically when violence erupted between foreign 
contractors and Iraqis.  Further, the limits of authority afforded to these companies, 
which were frequently and questionably exaggerated, created considerable tensions 
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within the humanitarian organizations operating in Iraq and the Iraqi population on a 
much broader level.  Perhaps the most notable example is the case of Blackwater 
Security Consulting, a private American military company.  On September 16, 2007, 
several of its employees shot and killed seventeen Iraqi civilians suspected of 
ambushing a convoy, which consequently outraged large swaths of the Iraqi population 
and permanently tainted public perception of the privatization of the Iraq War.   
These private companies also significantly shaped the ability of Iraqi NGOs to 
operate.  One aspect of this negative consequence on nation-based NGOs in Iraq was 
the overwhelmingly poor perception of said companies on the ground, particularly in 
communities in which both nation-based and international NGOs were attempting to 
serve.  As one outraged Baghdad resident expressed to the Associated Press in an 
interview on the private security companies working in Iraq, contracted employees ‘do 
whatever they want in the streets.  They beat citizens and scorn them’ (Reid 2). More 
directly related to Iraqi NGOs, however, are the ways in which these private security 
companies interacted with Iraqi humanitarian aid workers.  In one interview with an 
Iraqi NGO worker, the negative perception of these private security companies by Iraqi 
NGO workers is thoughtfully articulated: 
There was a strong juxtaposition between private security companies and the 
stated USAID mission.  They put local staff in danger, were crazy drivers, and 




 This sentiment expresses the centrality of humanitarian workers’ perception of 
foreign occupying forces in a security context.  The severely negative reputation of 
private security companies in Iraq directly impacted Iraqi civilians’ opinion of broader 
foreign actors, which, in this specific context, encompassed newly formed Iraqi NGOs, 
as well.  
 The first chapter discussed a predominant theme in humanitarian literature that 
explores the ‘blurring of the lines’ phenomenon between military and civilian actors, 
which has persisted in modern wars and has come to encompass a wider range of actors 
(in this case private security companies on the military side and local humanitarian 
actors on the civilian side). As Bjork and Jones explain, ‘NGOs…are a relatively new 
concept for the Iraqi population and the associated humanitarian imperatives….If, as is 
the case, the private sector and humanitarian NGOs are perceived as being part of the 
US-led reconstruction, the risk of being attacked increases’ (788).  Thus, humanitarian 
workers, regardless of nationality, became increasingly entrenched in a system of 
danger because of the violent and questionable tactics employed by American-
contracted private security companies.  Of further paramount importance, the variable 
of these privatized forces greatly influenced the construction of the Iraqi NGO sector in 
most of the country.  While Iraqi Kurdistan possessed a strong history of NGO culture, 
largely cultivated and facilitated by local rather than foreign forces, much of Iraq 
experienced the emergence of a NGO sector that paralleled American military invasion 
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and occupation.  Because private security companies were inseparable to this newly 
conceived humanitarianism, their very existence constructed for Iraqi humanitarian 
workers a sense of complicity in their actions, despite Iraqi NGOs’ largely negative 
view of said companies.  What emerged, and ultimately threatened the effectiveness of 
the Iraqi NGO sector during American military occupation, is the idea that the Iraqi 
humanitarian sector was to some extent affiliated with the foreign occupation and, 
more dangerously, the private security companies it heftily utilized.   
Insurgencies  
Perhaps the biggest nuisance for the aforementioned private security companies 
were the violent and heavily armed Iraqi insurgent groups that quickly formed 
throughout the country, overwhelmingly discontent with the American military 
occupation.  As Ehrenber, McSherry, and Sanchez argue, the insurgency during the 
occupation was predominately homegrown, indicative of the fact that the insurgency 
was not simply a function of historically warring Shia/Sunni factions without a 
powerful leader to forcibly unite them, nor was it solely the result of an artificially 
contrived Iraqi state drawn up of borders haphazardly encircling ‘incompatible’ ethnic 
groups (248).  While both of these arguments grasp the insurgent conflict to some 
extent, the specific political context encompassing Iraq decidedly aggravated sectarian 
tensions where they already existed, and in other cases created new ones.  In an 
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interview with a Sunni insurgent group, Jaish Muhammad (Army of Mohammad), one of 
its spokespersons expressed the discontent propelling violence on a much broader level 
for many insurgent groups: ‘Yes, the United States rid us of Saddam Hussein’s regime.  
But they did not do it for the sake of the people of Iraq.  Rather, they did it for the sake 
of Iraqi oil and to protect Israel’s security’ (“Islamists Pledge Continued War on 
Coalition”).  Further, despite the schisms separating Shia and Sunni groups fighting 
both the occupation and with one another, the insurgent factions similarly employed 
sophisticated internet and media tactics to spread their message, which universally 
called for an end to foreign occupation (Ehrenberg, McSherry, Sanchez, Sayej 249).  The 
insurgent crisis that erupted throughout Iraq during occupation not only reflected a 
deep-rooted discontent with a foreign military presence, but also exposed the country 
to strongly sectarian overtones.  More specifically, the violence created by insurgent 
groups was largely dependent on the specific region in the country.  According to 
statistics collected and interpreted by academics Luke Condra and Jake Shapiro, civilian 
casualties caused by insurgent attacks were largely dependent upon geographic and 
ethnic factors (177).  This sectarianism incited by insurgent groups throughout the 
occupation ultimately unleashed negative consequences for Iraqi NGOs, as their 
workers increasingly were confined to delivering humanitarian assistance to 




The final set of actors crucial in conceptualizing the security context surrounding 
the Iraqi humanitarian sector are the counterinsurgent groups that were employed to 
address the rapid emergence of insurgent groups outlined above.  Combined with the 
violence initiated by insurgent groups, counterinsurgent policies failed to quell the dire 
security situation enraging the country, consequently invigorating the sectarian 
tensions that had directly negative impacts on Iraqi NGOs.  While an insurgent element 
was certainly expected by the US Department of Defense from the outset of military 
invasion in Iraq, the level and violence with which the insurgency executed confounded 
American forces, consequently urging them to reconsider methods of counterinsurgent 
attacks.  The Pentagon drew upon past counterinsurgency methods, grappling with 
tactics employed in such war contexts as Vietnam and Latin America (Ehrenberg, 
McSherry, Sanchez, Sayej 226).  Vice President Dick Cheney even advocated for the 
Phoenix Program, a popular counterinsurgency method utilized during the Vietnam 
War, to structure CIA operations in Iraq, a method Jane Mayer argues appealed to 
Cheney for its ability to circumvent legal accountability and remain ‘below the radar for 
a really long time’ (144).  Despite the rather suspect nature of the Phoenix Program, 
however, the US Department of Defense expressed an ideology of minimal, rather than 
overt, counterinsurgent responses.  In a 2006 counterinsurgency final draft, the 
department outlined the so-called ‘paradoxes of counterinsurgency’, which claimed ‘the 
conduct of counterinsurgency is counterintuitive to the traditional American view of 
63 
 
war’ (“Counterinsurgency Final Draft”).  The document goes on to list such paradoxical 
axioms to address insurgent forces: ‘the more you protect your force, the less secure you 
are’, ‘more force used, the less effective it is’, ‘sometimes doing nothing is the best 
reaction’, and the ‘host nation doing something tolerably is sometimes better than us 
doing it well’ (“Counterinsurgency Final Draft”).  Kalev Sepp also acknowledges the 
military convergence towards a more pacified approach, a stark opposition to the 
dramatic ‘shock and awe’ tactic utilized with the grand entry of coalition forces in 2003 
that ousted the Ba’ath regime in mere days (218).   
Yet such counterinsurgency approaches, however adapted and nuanced, 
aggravated, rather than placated, sectarian divisions driving insurgent forces.  As 
Raymond Taras argues, the US military intervention and its subsequent 
counterinsurgency policies created disastrous consequences for Iraqi society: ‘Until the 
US occupation, the Sunni-Shia divide was primarily a political and economic-not 
religious-struggle over the distribution of wealth and political power….American 
military rule fostered conditions for civil war’ through radicalizing Sunni groups, 
engaging in power plays with Shia groups, and attracting militant jihadists from 
neighboring countries (53).  Steven Simon also critiques US counterinsurgency methods, 
claiming they contributed to ethnic-driven strife by ‘stoking the revanchist fantasies of 
Sunni Arab tribes…pitting them against the central government and one another’ (58).  
Thus, counterinsurgent forces, whether intentional or not, encouraged the ethnic divide 
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structuring and driving insurgent violence, a combined effect that precariously 
surrounded Iraq’s NGO sector. 
As civil war erupted between increasingly divisive factions throughout the 
country, Iraqi NGOs were compelled to adapt to a decidedly sectarian, chaotic 
environment. The violence initiated by insurgent groups impacted Iraqi NGOs in two 
distinct ways.  Firstly, the strongly sectarian undertones propelling violence throughout 
the region created a sense of mistrust amongst Iraqi civilians, consequently increasing 
the level of danger and risk involved in participating in nation-based NGOs.  As Iraqi-
American anthropologist Nadje Sandig al-Ali notes in her comprehensive study of Iraqi 
women’s political involvement, the increased violence catalyzed by foreign occupation 
but distinctly marred by sectarian factions significantly increased the number of 
kidnapping and killings of female, Iraqi NGO workers; as the occupation persisted, the 
notable risk of engaging in humanitarian-oriented work caused a decline, specifically 
amongst Iraqi women, in participating with nation-based NGO projects (241).   
A second effect the largely sectarian insurgent crisis had on Iraqi NGOs relates to 
the ways in which the organizations were composed and structured, largely a function 
of the sense of mistrust permeating throughout Iraqi society.  One Iraqi NGO worker 
explains: 
As the security crisis worsened, it became more and more common to not know 
what your neighbor did as a profession….people started to distrust one another 
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because it was unclear who they were supporting or who they were working for.  
This is why many NGOs in Iraq have employees that are related to each other.  It 
is much easier to work with your family; we feel safer working with people we 
can trust (Mahmood interview). 
Transcending religious or political biases, which are also common amongst Western 
humanitarian-NGOs, the mistrust and tension manifested by a highly sectarian 
atmosphere facilitated a structuring of many Iraqi NGOs that relied heavily upon 
family lineage, raising pertinent questions regarding how such organizations were able 
to maintain, if at all, a sense of impartiality and neutrality.  While there is not enough 
data currently to investigate how these family-composed organizations interacted with 
their local communities, Genot suggests there are ‘some factors unique to Iraq’s local 
and historical context’ which prevent ‘the ability of Iraqi NGOs to pursue the principles 
of independence and impartiality’ (28).  Thus, the military occupation of Iraq, 
specifically the security crisis it bred and its subsequent effects on Iraq’s humanitarian 
organizations, challenges the presumably infallible pillars of neutrality and impartiality 
upholding most Western NGOs, in turn situating their Iraqi counterparts in compelling, 







FOURTH CHAPTER: Structural Forces 
The final chapter focuses on the structure of Iraqi NGOs that existed throughout 
the American military occupation from 2003 to 2011 and the variables that influenced 
either their successes or failures.  As mentioned, the invasion and subsequent 
occupation initiated a rapid emergence of NGO formation; thousands of Iraqi-initiated 
organizations formed with the help of significant international funding and support, 
much of which were specifically humanitarian in focus.  The sheer number of 
organizations seems to suggest a thriving Iraqi civil society better equipped to organize 
and address humanitarian issues plaguing Iraq following military invasion; however, 
the level at which these organizations were able to effect positive change in their 
respective communities demands closer attention.  Accordingly, this chapter examines 
the types of structures shaping Iraqi, humanitarian-oriented NGOs that formed after 
2003 in an effort to gauge how the context of military occupation affected their ability to 
operate successfully.  Structure in this context refers to the ways in which newly 
conceived Iraqi NGOs were modeled.  This chapter focuses on two structural forces: the 
first being the international community involved in the termed ‘reconstruction’ of Iraq 
and the second being the Iraqi people either directly or indirectly involved in the NGOs 
in their communities.  The international community predominately encompasses the 
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foreign coalition government in Iraq, foreign governmental agencies, and international 
NGOs dedicated, either monetarily or on a more logistical level, in the process of co-
forming or assisting Iraqi NGOs in their development.  While the amount of funding 
targeted towards the broader reconstruction of Iraq’s infrastructure inched into the 
billions, of which Iraqi NGOs received a considerable portion, the international 
community’s influence on and involvement in the nation-based NGOs can be termed 
largely negative.  The second structural force includes the wide variety of Iraqi 
humanitarian workers drawn into the nascent Iraqi NGO sector and the Iraqi 
government, a group of actors that prove more complicated in determining how they 
specifically impacted said sector.  As I will argue, these structural forces enacted both 
positive and negative changes for Iraqi NGOs.  This chapter will thus outline the two 
structural forces delineated above, ultimately raising broader questions about Iraqi 
NGOs’ place within Iraq’s civil society, and whether or not civil society can be 
constructed from above by largely foreign, rather than nation-based, forces.   
Conceptualizing Civil Society 
Before examining the structural forces, a brief background on civil society, both 
its history and geographic variations, is required, particularly since this chapter argues 
Iraqi NGOs were conceived by both international and nation-based actors as a pivotal 
portion of Iraq’s broader civil society.  This brief history will prove crucial when more 
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conceptual considerations are made about Iraq’s NGO sector, particularly the ways in 
which international, largely Western, forces greatly shaped these NGOs despite 
possessing differing notions of civil society from many Iraqis.   
The notion of civil society can be traced to the Scottish Enlightenment, where 
those such as Adam Smith, David Hume, and Adam Ferguson conceived the 
commercial sector as capable of fostering cohesive social values (Candland 140, 2001). 
Private property also factors significantly into many conceptualizations of civil society, 
as such theorists as Rousseau and Hegel stress the importance of the private market, 
along with its consumers and workers, to civil society.  The current connection drawn 
between civil society and democratic environments largely factored into Alexis de 
Tocqueville’s work, and was later developed in the twentieth century by such scholars 
as Sidney Verba and Gabriel Almond, both of whom expressed the necessity of a 
politically active civil society in democratic governments.  American political scientist 
Robert Putnam additionally argues that non-political organizations, such as art or 
sports-focused groups, also facilitate a healthy civil society despite not being directly 
involved in politics.  Common themes throughout many of these largely Western 
notions of civil society center on a sense of volunteerism and democratic order.  The 
organizations that constitute significant portions of civil society are composed of people 
voluntarily involved, therefore not to make a profit or forced to do so by others.  These 
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arguments also hint at the inherent link between democratic order and the health of 
civil society, presumably a directly proportional relationship.   
Yet many theorists and critics have argued against these assumptions, raising 
pertinent questions about the ways in which civil society is shaped by cultural and 
political factors on the one hand, and structurally imbalanced globally.  In his report on 
civil society in the “third world”, Richard Pithouse argues there exists a distinct rift 
between the more privileged Northern NGOs and their Southern NGO counterparts, 
citing South Africa as an example: “South African sub-imperialism is not just about 
South African capital…but it is also about the fact that South Africa is a very, very 
important site for co-opted Northern NGOs to legitimate themselves” (5).   Similarly, Jai 
Sen argues the recent academic focus on a ‘global civil society’ glosses over 
ramifications that exacerbate neocolonial relations.  The supposed ‘consolidation and 
cooperation’ characteristic of this global civil society is also a consolidation, to some 
extent, of “historically unequal social and political relations and entrenched interests at 
local, national, regional, and global levels” (19).  Within this framework, prominent 
global civil society actors, mainly stemming from the West, reinforce, rather than 
unravel, the rigidly cemented power structures situating the most regionally helpless in 
persistently subordinate positions.  Further, the notion of globalization and its effects on 
civil society is also a subject of considerable debate amongst academics and 
policymakers.  As Pawel Stefan Zaleski notes, the development of civil society on a 
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global level was part of a broader plan of spreading neo-liberal values and strategies 
following the fall of communism in Europe, encompassed most tellingly in the 
Washington Consensus (“Neoliberalism and Civil Society”).  And because globalization 
includes transnational businesses and institutions that have funded, supported, or even 
created civil society organizations throughout the world, the intersection between the 
concepts of civil society and globalization oftentimes creates considerable confusion and 
controversy.   
How do these formulations of civil society apply to the Iraqi humanitarian-
oriented NGOs that emerged during American military occupation?  In a positive sense, 
the NGOs formed by Iraqis during this period reflected organizational strategies that 
cultivated the types of “social virtues” Enlightenment thinkers conceived as necessary 
in a civil society.  Further, the removal of a totalitarian regime allowed for organizations 
to direct themselves with political and advocacy purposes in a way that the former 
Ba’ath regime stifled.  On the contrary, however, it is impossible to fully conceptualize 
these humanitarian NGOs without considering their presence as directly under a 
Western occupation.  In this context, the cautionary arguments of Pithouse and Jai Sen 
demand a specific type of conceptualization when situating these NGOs as crucial 
actors within Iraq’s reconstructed civil society.  
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With these historical and conceptual frameworks in mind, the development of 
Iraq’s civil society as part of a broader reconstruction plan initiated and overlooked by 
an American-led coalition government is better situated for critical examination.  One of 
the fundamental issues central to the Iraqi context relates to the idea of top-down civil 
society formation, as opposed to a civil society fostered and cultivated amongst 
communities.  As outlined in the introduction, a strong sense of civic and political 
involvement existed during moments of the Ba’ath regime in Iraq, yet particularly 
towards the end of President Saddam Hussein’s presence in office, his Ba’ath 
government stifled political expression and dissent in such a way that any political 
organizations, besides those that existed in Iraqi Kurdistan, not directly associated with 
the Iraqi government were drastically restricted, if not completely incapable of 
operation.  It was not until the American military invasion and the subsequent ousting 
of Saddam Hussein that a newly conceived political space was created for civil society 
organizations to form; however, to conclude the drastic introduction of supposedly 
freeing, democratic forces cultivated a healthy Iraqi civil society is simply incorrect at 
best and destructive at worst.  Significant funding and logistical support swiftly enabled 
the creation of a large, diverse Iraqi NGO sector, yet the structural forces constructing 
these organizations ultimately set many of them up for failure, as will be discussed 
more thoroughly in the bulk of this chapter.  Thus, framing many of the strategies 
employed by the structural forces mentioned previously as part of a broader top-down 
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approach is crucial when conceptualizing the ways in which Iraq’s civil society was 
reconstructed during this period.   
Iraqi Structural Forces 
The Iraqi forces critical in forming the structures of humanitarian-oriented, 
nation-based organizations during military occupation  consisted of Iraqi civilians, both 
within and outside of government, mostly concerned with addressing the grave 
humanitarian needs of the Iraqi population.  Several thousand Iraqi non-governmental 
organizations formed rather quickly after the American invasion.  What is perhaps 
indicative of the complexity inherent in the vast, bordering on turbulent, emergence of 
Iraqi NGOs during this period is the sheer diversity in their structures.  According to 
the NGO Coordination Committee of Iraq, created in April of 2003 to increase the 
efficiency of coordination and communication amongst civil society organizations 
operating in Iraq, approximately ten thousand new NGOs in 2006 were either already 
registered or awaiting registration by the newly formed Iraqi government, an 
astonishingly high number that does not include unofficially recognized NGOs that 
either circumvented the registration process or were unable to achieve registration 
standards, usually due to a lack of funding or personnel (Genot 12).   
Nevertheless, the ten thousand organizations adhering to official registration 
guidelines ran the gamut of structure from in terms of size, effectiveness, and character.  
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Contrary to established NGOs elsewhere in the world, many Iraqi NGOs during this 
period consisted of only two or three persons, representing a variety of ethnic, religious, 
and regional backgrounds.  Some nation-based NGOs that emerged during this time 
were simply hollow shells, or, as Genot terms them, ‘ingenuous’ organizations, that 
acquired money from donor sources only to engage in alternate investments or simply 
pocket the funding for personal gain (21).  Further, many of these organizations were 
actually created with the intended purpose of making a profit, basing their structures 
off of business-like models (Genot 21).  Yet it would be misleading to suggest that the 
NGOs described above were neatly dichotomized, with the business-oriented, profit-
inclined organizations on one end and the purely benign, humanitarian-oriented 
organizations gathered at the opposite end.  Given the uncertain political and economic 
contexts situating the majority of Iraqi civilians in precarious positions, selfish motives 
for creating NGOs, even those with primarily humanitarian orientations, seemed 
inevitable: “In a country which was destroyed, which was worn out economically-
speaking, it was normal that people stacked the deck in their favor” (al-Hassaf 
interview).  Thus, in contrast to the larger, more institutionalized foreign (mainly 
Western) NGOs, many Iraqi NGOs occupied a rather complicated space within the 
humanitarian arena in that they were incentivized by potential funding sources to fuel 
not only the organization’s livelihood, but also to economically support their employees 
that desperately required an income, a concept that will be explored more thoroughly 
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when international structural forces are considered.  This sort of diversity in turn 
complicated international NGOs’ decisions when deciding which nation-based NGOs 
to partner with.  For example, establishing partnerships became crucial during the 
period in which all international NGOs evacuated Iraq in 2004, as many would 
coordinate with nation-based, Iraqi organizations from neighboring Jordan or Kuwait, 
among other locations, in order to continue operations.  Yet because a considerable 
amount of for-profit Iraqi NGOs existed, specifically those that garnered negative 
reputations for their questionable tactics when dealing with Iraqi civilians, a sense of 
caution prevailed amongst many international NGOs when considering establishing 
partnerships with their Iraqi counterparts.   
Another element of the Iraqi structural forces shaping the emerging NGO was an 
association with one’s religious identities, which was especially heightened during 
American occupation and manifested, to some degree, in the ways in which many Iraqi 
NGOs operated .  Islamic movements in the broader Arab world have consistently 
reflected humanitarian tendencies, providing various forms of charity during times of 
crises.  Several academics have examined this phenomenon such as Mona al-Ghobashy, 
who argues that in certain political contexts, Islamic organizations have arisen as more 
effective and responsive to civilian needs than the acting government, consequently 
augmenting said organizations’ political clout on the ground (381).  The Muslim 
Brotherhood’s rapid and pervasive response to the 1992 earthquake in Egypt stands as a 
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notable example, which magnified the Islamic organization’s political power to an 
unprecedented level and created a widespread sense of credence amongst the Egyptian 
population.  Several charity-oriented principles also serve as crucial pillars of Islam, 
particularly zakat, literally meaning ‘that which purifies’ in Arabic, and sadaqah, 
‘charity’, both of which encompass the act of giving either monetarily or through other 
means to those in need.  Muslim organizations in Iraq, particularly the Red Crescent 
Society, which is branched throughout the Muslim world in various countries, possess a 
long history of conducting charity and other humanitarian-related activities.   Another 
principle of the Islam is the concept of waqf, literally meaning ‘confinement’ or 
‘detention’, which is perhaps the most institutionalized of the charity-oriented Muslim 
practices in terms of its presence in Islamic governments.  According to the Encyclopedia 
of Islam, waqf refers to ‘the holding and preservation of a certain property for the 
confined benefit of a certain philanthropy with the intention of prohibiting any use or 
disposition of the property outside of that specific purpose’ (Kahif).  In its strictest 
sense, waqf is a religious institution dedicated to serving the poor, but the Islamic 
principle contains a multitude of political, economic, and social interpretations, 
manifesting physically in government-sanctioned parks and buildings while also 
playing a prominent role in navigating the direction of religiously funded charity 
(Morgan 22).  In Iraq, the Office of Shiite Waqf, the Office of Sunni Waqf, and the Office 
of Non-Muslim Waqf were established by the Iraq Governing Council (IGC) in January 
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of 2004 (IGC Resolutions 17 and 18, 2004).  Thus, during the American occupation, 
religious organizations that already existed were heightened in relevance, while many 
humanitarian-oriented organizations would structure themselves based on Islamic 
principles (Genot 24).  Many of these organizations already had highly developed 
connections within the communities they were operating, which was leveraged during 
the occupation and subsequently eased their ability to effectively actualize their projects 
across broad spectrums of the population.   
However, the strident religious sectarianism that fueled much of the violence 
throughout the military occupation, namely between Shia and Sunnia factions, 
complicated the religious structures and intentions navigating many Iraqi NGOs.  On 
the one hand, as particular regions throughout the country became increasingly 
entrenched along sectarian lines, humanitarian-oriented Iraqi NGOs, specifically those 
claiming Muslim identities, witnessed a narrowing sphere of operation; many regions 
throughout the country, with the exception of Iraqi Kurdistan in the north, grew more 
and more hostile to certain ethno-religious groups, consequently fostering a civil society 
atmosphere for only certain factions of people depending on the geographic region.  
Yet, on the other hand, Muslim organizations generally fared far better than their 
foreign and secular counterparts (Iqbal al-Juboori interview).  Both of because their 
religious structures as well as their lack of perceived connection with foreign occupying 
powers, Muslim organizations developed stronger ties within their respective 
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communities of operation, while secular NGOs had more difficulty in establishing their 
autonomy from occupying powers to other Iraqis.  As insurgent and broader Iraqi 
civilian hostility towards foreign occupiers increased, which ultimately embraced all 
foreign actors in general whether or not a direct association with the American 
occupation existed, international NGOs found their communities of target increasingly 
suspicious of their presence.   
The final Iraqi structural force crucial in shaping the Iraqi NGO sector during 
military occupation is the Iraqi government, which consisted of largely coalition 
appointed Iraqi civilians.  Up until 2004, the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) served as an 
interim government, and was replaced by a permanent government in 2005 following 
the disbandment of the CPA.  Yet it was the IGC that drafted several resolutions 
focusing specifically on both civil society in general and NGOs in particular, resolutions 
that would largely dictate future laws and actions by Iraqi governmental officials 
throughout the over decade long occupation.  In his farewell address to the CPA, CPA 
head Paul Bremer charged the IGC and Iraqi society at large to develop a “democratic, 
accountable, and self-governing civil society”, so that several portions of the IGC 
constitution outlined a governmental framework that would cultivate a civil society 
populated by efficient, impactful NGOs (Bremer 262).  Defining non-governmental 
organizations as “any organization or foundation that is organized to 
undertake…humanitarian assistance and relief projects; human rights advocacy and 
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awareness; development of civil society…or any other non-profit activity that serves the 
public interest”, the IGC and the subsequent permanent government placed an 
importance on NGOs, crafting a sphere for them to operate and function.  Further, the 
Iraqi government eventually established a streamlined process for NGO registration, 
which allowed for a way of recording and monitoring civil society organizations that 
had not existed under Hussein’s rule.  As most of the Iraqi NGO workers interviewed 
noted, this institutionalized process of NGO creation under government control helped 
curb the chaotic sprouting of organizations prominent in the beginning of the 
occupation, ultimately weeding out the organizations claiming to adhere to 
humanitarian purposes but in reality only hoping to receive funding for personal 
reasons (al-Juboori, Ali interviews).  The government structuring was not universally 
favorable, however, as Iraqi NGO worker Iqbal al-Juboori explains: 
The creation of a government body to help NGOs become official and 
operable was necessary in theory, but in reality the civil society office has 
made it extremely hard for people to obtain licenses and become 
registered (31 December 2014). 
Another Iraqi NGO worker, Rachid Mahmood, affirms the above opinion while also 
touching upon the newly formed Iraqi government’s detachment from the civil society 
it purports to serve: 
There are constantly new requirements for NGOs to acquire certification and re-
certification; we have to show them our bank accounts, too, which need a certain 
amount of money in them.  The constant update of requirements comes out of 
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nowhere, though, and most of us don’t know the reasons behind their execution 
(20 February 2015). 
The Iraqi government’s inclusion of nation-based NGOs into a broader 
philosophy of cultivating an active civil society thus presented several complexities to 
the humanitarian sphere of Iraq.  On the one hand, the level at which laws, regulations, 
and recognition the Iraqi interim and permanent governments expressed was 
unwitnessed before 2003, ultimately creating for Iraqi civil society a space of operation 
that, at least on the surface level, acknowledged the necessity of actors beyond the 
governmental sphere to tackle Iraq’s most pressing humanitarian crises.  Yet the reality 
for many Iraqi NGO workers suggests a distance rife with miscommunication and 
misunderstanding existed between the two sectors.  While the nascent Iraqi NGO sector 
grappled with their newly, and in many cases haphazardly, structured organizations 
amidst a deplorable security context, the Iraqi government, too, struggled with the 
chaos of weaving completely reconfigured institutions together.  Such a task 
necessitated the cultivation of an Iraqi civil society consisting of a variety of functional 
NGOs, but it also proved, in reality, difficult to actualize. 
International Structural Forces 
The international forces outlined above are most relevant on a structural level 
when considered from a funding perspective.  From the outset of the military invasion 
in 2003, millions of US dollars were funneled towards the specific purpose of facilitating 
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the creation and operation of Iraqi NGOs.  Undoubtedly, the amount of money coming 
into Iraq at this time was the main reason thousands of nation-based NGOs actualized 
so quickly.  The US Congress allocated $50 billion for the reconstruction of Iraq, $3 
billion of which was for the specific use of “development” (Genot 18).  Mainly 
stemming from coalition governments (the United States being the top donor) and 
international organizations, other funding sources were given widely and generously to 
Iraqi NGOs; in fact, beyond the tens of millions of dollars devoted exclusively to Iraqi 
NGOs $10 million was targeted towards programs for women and youth that promoted 
the skills and ideas necessary to cultivate an Iraqi civil society (CPA 220).  Yet very 
quickly the amount of funding created two distinct structural problems for the 
collective Iraqi NGO sector.  Firstly, much of the funding targeted towards increasing 
the efficacy of Iraqi NGOs proved wasteful and misdirected.  Many Iraqi NGO workers 
were given copious amounts of money to travel to international conferences and stay at 
luscious European hotels, all the while bringing back mostly futile skills and ideas for 
implementing projects in an Iraqi context (Genot 20).  Even more alarmingly, the 
irresponsible allocation and implementation of funding transcended the Iraqi NGO 
sector.  In a report to the US Congress, the US Department of Defense expressed that it 
was unable to account for $8.7 billion of the $9.1 billion it received for reconstruction 
efforts in occupied Iraq (Genot 22).  Thus, many new Iraqi NGOs during military 
occupation were given enough funds to operate, but the ways in which these funds 
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were poorly directed failed to robustly and sustainably structure many Iraqi NGOs 
proportionally to the copious amount of money acquired.  Another consequence of 
significant international funding likely had more of a lasting and negative impact on the 
Iraqi NGO sector.  Obtaining international funds for the creation and function of NGOs 
quickly became the easiest and surest way of obtaining money in general, especially 
since de-Baathification and a collapsed economy did little to accommodate the 
socioeconomic needs of most Iraqi civilians.  Thus, very quickly, working for NGOs 
became a way to simply make a living at best and an avenue to squander government 
funds for personal use at worst.  As one Iraqi NGO worker noted, ‘I would say 25% of 
all Iraqi NGOs are of noble purpose, but most of them were created just to obtain 
money’ (Mahmood interview).  Because so many organizations espousing humanitarian 
purposes were merely empty vessels of corruption, the collective reputation of the Iraqi 
NGO sector was tarnished.  This had lasting effects for Iraqi NGOs trying to obtain 
funding in the later years of occupation as international aid dwindled, as well as for 








CHAPTER FIVE: Conclusion 
 
  
This paper aims to answer how the US military occupation of Iraq from 2003 to 
2011 affected Iraqi, humanitarian-oriented non-governmental organizations.  By 
examining international NGOs and the relationships with their Iraqi counterparts, the 
security crisis enveloping the country, and the structural forces-both international and 
domestic in nature- critical in shaping the Iraqi NGO sector, I have attempted to outline 
the causal factors that most prominently impacted the Iraqi NGOs within a military 
occupation context.  Through the consideration of these variables, two important 
observations can be made.  On the one hand, the US military invasion of Iraq in 2003 
and the subsequent eight year occupation directly facilitated the emergence of a broad 
Iraqi NGO sector consisting of hundreds of organizations with humanitarian focuses.  
By ousting President Saddam Hussein and his highly repressive Ba’ath regime and 
attempting to construct a democratic government inclusive of civil society 
organizations, American forces allowed for Iraqi NGOs to emerge at an unwitnessed 
level.  Further, through generous funding from foreign government and international 
organizations, the nascent Iraqi NGOs had access to monetary sources that would 
greatly enable their operation.  The international NGOs that flocked to Iraq from the 
outset of the military occupation also positively impacted their Iraqi-based counterparts 
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on multiple levels, particularly by offering logistic services and, once most left Iraq due 
to security reasons, allowing for Iraqi humanitarian organizations and personnel to 
garner acute importance as they were among the very few addressing humanitarian 
concerns in the country.  On the other hand, however, the military occupation 
ultimately created an environment harmful for Iraqi NGOs to operate.  American forces 
largely executed a poorly run occupation which dismantled the Iraqi infrastructure, 
exacerbated sectarian tensions, and dismissed considerable swaths of the Iraqi 
population from their government jobs through de-Ba’athification.  Through the 
employment of private security companies to carry out security and reconstruction 
tasks, the humanitarian landscape in Iraq significantly shifted.  These companies 
negatively impacted reconstruction efforts, while also damaging the collective foreign 
reputation within Iraqi society.  Iraqi civilians increasingly perceived international and 
Iraqi humanitarian organizations as aligned with the mistrusted foreign occupation, so 
that the ability of these organizations to function optimally was consistently 
compromised.  Further, the occupation and interim governments exacerbated sectarian 
tension amongst the Iraqi population, so that insurgent and counterinsurgent forces 
created an environment hostile for Iraqi NGOs to implement their projects.  And while 
significant foreign funding facilitated the creation of many Iraqi humanitarian 
organizations, these funding avenues became one of the few ways for civilians to earn 
an income.  Because of this, much of the Iraqi NGO sector consisted of “empty-shell” 
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organizations simply laundering money for personal use.  Thus, the impact of the US 
military occupation on Iraqi, humanitarian NGOs is two-sided; delineating the military 
occupation context as a complete success or failure for the Iraqi NGO sector would be 
misleading.   
Limitations 
 Before considering these observations on a broader level beyond the Iraqi 
context, the limitations hampering this project must be considered.  Perhaps most 
glaringly, the academic literature that exists on Iraqi NGOs, much less Iraq’s civil 
society as a whole, is dismally meager.  The few people who have written about this 
subject are mostly humanitarian aid workers themselves, writing for their respective 
organizations and offering largely policy-related suggestions rather than examining the 
issue from an academic standpoint.   
Relatedly, while a considerable portion of my research relied crucially on 
interviews with current Iraqi humanitarian workers, the information gathered from 
these interactions is highly subjective and opinion-based.  The workers I spoke with 
were predominately timid to offer any perspectives on their organizations that were not 
positive, so while the input they provided on the military occupation was complex and 
valuable, I had difficulty drawing definitive conclusions on the ways in which Iraqi 
humanitarian workers felt about their organizations as a whole.  This is most likely due 
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to the workers wanting to avoid tarnishing their organizations’ images, and, in some 
cases, for privacy concerns (a few workers I spoke with desired that they remain 
anonymous as they were worried about putting their jobs at risk).  Additionally, the 
perspectives offered by these Iraqi humanitarian workers come from a place of 
retrospection.  Because the collective political, security, and economic situation of Iraq 
has deteriorated significantly since complete US combat removal at the end of 2011, 
several of the Iraqi workers I spoke with expressed a sense of difficulty in disentangling 
current frustrations from their perspectives on the period considered for this study.   
In addition to the limitations of academic literature and interviews with Iraqi 
humanitarian workers, the recent nature of the Iraq War poses its own set of issues.  
While officially ending within the past four years, historical formulations of the war as a 
whole are nascent and malleable.  How academics, policy makers, and humanitarians 
conceptualize the effects of the Iraq War on Iraqi society will inevitably shift 
considerably in the coming years as the distance of time allows for more objective 
observations.   
Iraqi NGOs as Products of a Top-Down Approach 
 The artificiality debate mentioned at the beginning of this study provides a 
compelling lens with which to consider the Iraqi NGO sector during the context of a 
military occupation.  This debate suggests that the superficial ways in which colonial 
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bordering and repetitive foreign interference constructed the Iraqi state have led to 
lasting consequences for the country.  Toby Dodge compellingly expands on this 
argument by paralleling British colonialism of Iraq during the early twentieth century 
with the US occupation beginning in 2003:  
The manner in which order was imposed on Iraq, both under the mandate and 
after April 2003, profoundly shaped the interaction, or more accurately the lack 
of it, between the population and the nascent institutions of the state and 
ultimately played the key role in the comparative failures of state-building. (191) 
Thus, one cannot separate the exogenous methods of state-formation in Iraq from the 
country’s meager institutions; these two concepts are crucially interrelated and provide 
meaningful considerations for the emergence of the Iraqi NGO sector during US 
military occupation.  As examined in chapter four, the international forces largely 
responsible for the emergence and persistence of the majority of Iraqi humanitarian-
oriented NGOs stemmed from US government sources, which provided the monetary 
and logistical support required to construct a new Iraqi NGO sector.  This top-down 
approach ultimately compromised the efficacy of many Iraqi humanitarian 
organizations.  Their very existence relied, in many cases, on temporary aid that was 
contingent on certain requirements formulated by US government officials.  Contrary to 
the more successful NGO sector in Iraqi Kurdistan, which existed in a much larger 
capacity compared to the rest of Iraq before 2003, a top-down approach part and parcel 
87 
 
of a broader American reconstruction package facilitated the emergence of much of the 
Iraqi, humanitarian-oriented NGO sector considered in this study.   
By affirming the condition that humanitarian-focused NGOs serve as crucial 
forces in any civil society and accepting Diamond’s definition of civil society outlined 
previously (“an intermediary entity standing between the private sphere and the 
state”), the Iraqi NGOs considered in this study raise pertinent questions about military 
interventions and the roles they play, both positive and negative, in configuring a host 
country’s civil society.  The question this study aimed to answer, how military 
occupation impacted Iraqi NGOs during the 2003-2011 time period, thus fails to capture 
the much larger and pressing issue of if and how an intervening government can play a 
significant exogenous role in forming civil society organizations in an occupied country.  
Should a thriving civil society, and more specifically the NGOs it fosters, always stand 
upon a foundation of agency actualized by the civilians of the concerned country?  Are 
the Iraqi NGOs formed during the most recent American occupation of Iraq destined 
for failure because of the foreign structural forces critical in their actualization, forces 
that no longer support financially or not to the same extent?  These questions demand 
further examination in future studies on not just Iraqi NGOs, but NGOs globally, 




The Importance of Iraq’s NGOs 
 Despite the largely negative factors affecting the ability of Iraq’s humanitarian 
NGOs to operate optimally during US military occupation, the very existence of these 
organizations reflects an important shift in the ways in which many Iraqis conceptualize 
a civil society for their country.  Every Iraqi humanitarian worker I spoke with 
expressed a strong sense of affirmation in not only their work but the Iraqi 
humanitarian sector as a whole.  The organizations that emerged, some consisting of 
only two or three people, are revolutionary in nature, at least in the Iraqi context.  
Within months of the expulsion of an authoritarian regime, thousands of Iraqi civilians, 
invigorated with the promise of living in a democratic society, congregated to form 
NGOs of their own, each unique in perspective and approach to the disastrous 
circumstances enveloping the country.   
Future military interventions, especially those spearheaded by the US, are 
inevitable.  The Iraqi case, while ubiquitously devastating for Iraqi society, does offer 
compelling insights on the role of domestic NGOs during an occupation period.  
Whether already existent or formed following invasion, domestic NGOs with 
humanitarian orientations possess the unique ability of not only addressing 
humanitarian concerns (which their international counterparts are often more equipped 
and experienced in), but also developing crucial social networks in the process of 
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alleviating communities entrenched in deplorable circumstances (which their 
international counterparts can rarely enact).  These social networks enhance the 
prospects of a healthy civil society. 
What Western media consistently glossed over in its coverage of Iraq in the 
beginning of US occupation, which largely featured angered civilians looting buildings 
and engaging in violence against one another and towards American soldiers, was the 
overwhelming actualization of people invested in forming a civil society, in whatever 
capacity, through the construction of NGOs.   This study has suggested the context of 
the US military occupation, while facilitating the emergence of an Iraqi NGO sector, 
provided a largely negative atmosphere for these humanitarian organizations to 
operate; however, it does not argue a civil society did not exist during this period, nor 
does it suggest the projects these organizations implemented failed to positively impact 
Iraqi society.  Rather, I would stress the existence of these organizations indicate civil 
societies can evolve and reconfigure amidst the chaotic political and economic contexts 
characteristic of military occupation.  The negative variables during occupation 
hampering the ability of Iraqi humanitarian NGOs to function are unquestionable--the 
agency inherent in the Iraqi civilians who formed NGOs to cultivate a newly conceived 
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